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I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom is, and long has been, that there are
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good preferences and bad preferences, with only the latter subject to
avoidance and recapture.' Over two hundred years ago Lord Mansfield
observed, "A general question has been started, whether a man may or
may not, at the eve of a bankruptcy, give a preference to a particular
creditor? I think he may, and he may not."'2 In a speech given shortly
after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Referee Morris
Wise observed, "Consequently in providing for the prohibition of pref-
erences, Congress has, at all times, in the history of the Bankruptcy
legislation of the country, carefully endeavored to preserve a distinc-
tion between what may be termed guilty and innocent preferences."
'3
The bankruptcy law in the United States today follows the con-
ventional wisdom and permits only the avoidance of preferences of the
bad variety.4 A preference neutered from the adjoining denomination
of good or bad refers simply to the transfer of property of an insolvent
1. See, e.g., C. Robert Morris, Jr., Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret
Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MINN. L. REv. 737, 738-39 (1970). Professor Morris stated
that "[t~he bad preference ... is one which involves some element of culpability." Id. at
739.
Although Professor Morris wrote before the major 1978 bankruptcy law revision,
which supposedly placed the preference law on a more objective basis and reduced the
emphasis on culpability, see infra notes 48-50, 52-53, 217 and accompanying text, the
view that he presented has not passed from the scene. For example, Professor-Dean-
Provost Jackson asserts that "preference law is a creditor misbehavior rule." THOMAS H.
JACKSON, THE LoGIc AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTcY LAW 126 n.8 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
He published an earlier article, Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REv. 725, 756-77 (1984), the cited portion of which largely comprises chapter 6
of his book. For cites that appear in both the article and the book, this Article will cite to
the book.
Avoidance of a preference is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 547; recapture is governed by
11 U.S.C. § 550.
2. Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (K.B. 1768) (emphasis added). He
added, "If one demands it first, or sues him, or threatens him, without fraud, the prefer-
ence is good. But where it is manifestly to defeat the law, it is bad." Id.
The English view still is that a preference given in response to creditor pressure is
valid. See John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression
of Doubt, 67 VA. L. Rav. 249, 252 (1981). The current bankruptcy law in the United
States has moved away from this approach. Such a preference would meet all of the
elements of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and would not be a transfer in the ordinary course of
business under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).
3. Morris S. Wise, Preferences: Guilty or Innocent, Address Before the Annual
Meeting of the Nat'l Ass'n of Referees in Bankruptcy (Aug. 30, 1900), in 2 NAT'L BANKE.
NEws & REP., Oct. 1, 1900, at 7.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code is found in Title 11 of the United
States Code and is referred to herein as the "Code" or "Bankruptcy Code." It was en-
acted on November 6, 1978, in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549, and governs bankruptcy cases filed on or after October 1, 1979. The law
applicable to cases filed prior to October 1, 1979 is known as and will be referred to
herein as the "Bankruptcy Act" or "Act." Act of Dec. 20, 1950, ch. 1138, 64 Stat. 1113.
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debtor to one of its creditors shortly before the debtor goes into bank-
ruptcy, thus enabling that creditor to receive more than it would have
otherwise.5 The essential attribute of such a transfer is that one credi-
tor gets paid and others do not.6 Creditors are treated unequally, at a
time when the debtor was insolvent.
Under the conventional wisdom, however, this fact standing alone
is not enough to cast the transaction into the ultimate categories of
good or bad-or, more specifically, to determine whether the transac-
tion is avoidable. What, then, is the decisive factor that determines the
avoidability of the transaction, whether that transfer falls on the good
or bad side of the line? One answer, which has been expressed and
implemented in a variety of ways over the past two and one-half centu-
ries,' is that payments made to creditors in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and trade are permitted. Payments made outside of that ordinary
course of business, on the other hand, are much more likely to be
avoided.
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. My thesis is that
5. Professor Douglas Baird defined preferences as "eve-of-bankruptcy transfers to
creditors that distort bankruptcy's pro rata sharing rule." DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELE-
MENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 155 (1992); see also Elizabeth A. Orelup, Note, Avoidance of Pref-
erential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IOWA L. REv. 209, 209
(1979).
The elements of an avoidable preference are detailed in 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Under
that subsection the bankruptcy trustee must prove, 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988):
(1) a transfer, id. § 547(b); see id. § 101(54) (Supp. II 1990);
(2) of the debtor's property, id. § 547(b) (1988); see id. § 541 (1988 & Supp. II
1990); -
(3) to or for the benefit of a creditor, id. § 547(b)(1) (1988); see id. § 101(10)
(Supp. II 1990);
(4) for an antecedent debt, id. § 547(b)(2) (1988);
(5) while the debtor was insolvent, id. § 547(b)(3); see id. § 101(32) (Supp. II
1990);
(6) during the preference period, id. § 547(b)(4) (1988); and
(7) which enables the creditor to receive more than it would have in a Chapter
7 case if the transfer had not been made, id. § 547(b)(5), i.e., the transfer has a
preferential effect.
Insolvency is presumed for the 90 days before bankruptcy, id. § 547(f), thus making
the trustee's proof substantially easier. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138-39 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
The preference period is 90 days, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988), except for insid-
ers, for whom a one-year reach back is utilized, id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
If the trustee proves the elements of a preference under § 547(b), the creditor then
has the opportunity to prove that one or more of the exceptions of § 547(c) protect it
from preference avoidance. One of those safe harbors, § 547(c)(2), is the focus of this
Article.
6. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 123.
7. See An Act for Amending the Laws Relating to Bankrupts, 1746, 19 Geo. 2, ch.
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many of the currently protected good preferences should be made sub-
ject to avoidance and recapture. 8 Specifically, I advocate the repeal of
the ordinary course of business exception in section 547(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.9 That section undercuts the proper basis of prefer-
8. My concern is with the application of the preference law to unsecured credi-
tors. Issues relating to secured creditors, such as the optimal way to deal with the float-
ing lien, see 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1988), and the proper treatment of enabling loans, id.
§ 547(c)(3), raise very different problems, and are beyond the scope of this Article.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988). I therefore second the suggestion of Professor
Vern Countryman, who in his inimitable style concluded, "In view of the feeble inspira-
tion for this exception, and because the exception is completely at war with the concept
of a preference and has no rational confining limits, the best future for present section
547(c)(2) is repeal." Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bank-
ruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 776 (1985) (footnote omitted). In his overall conclusion to
the article, he repeated this view in equally emphatic language. Id. at 817.
The basic idea is not a new one. Over fifty years ago Referee F.W. Thomas suggested
repealing the requirement that a preference could be recovered only if the creditor had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, found in § 60b of the 1898 Act,
as amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938) (repealed 1978).
See infra part III(0). The major premise was that "a preference is a preference." Paul H.
King, Proposed Amendments to the Chandler Act, 45 CoM. L.J. 36, 41 (1940). Referee
Thomas's suggestion was put forward in a speech by Paul King, then chairman of the
National Bankruptcy Conference, who himself added that "the suggestion has force." Id.
Although Congress in 1978 did repeal the reasonable cause to believe test, see infra
notes 49-53, 217 and accompanying text, the introduction of the ordinary course excep-
tion in § 547(c)(2) has essentially led to many of the same difficulties that existed with
the reasonable cause test. See Darrell Dunham & Donald Price, The End of Preference
Liability for Unsecured Creditors: New Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 60
IND. LJ. 487, 512 (1985).
A note published soon after the enactment of the 1978 Code stated, "If not narrowly
construed, the 'ordinary course' exception could provide a loophole that would signifi-
cantly weaken the entire structure of preference law." Orelup, supra note 5, at 236.
Courts and Congress have ignored this caveat, and the prediction made has come true.
Another commentator writing shortly after the Code's passage predicted accurately
that the "exception will likely emerge as a popular defense against a trustee's preference
action, thereby succeeding the widely used 'reasonable cause to believe' defense under
the Act." Morris W. Macey, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 EMORY L.J: 685, 693 (1979).
I also support, in part, the views of Professor Lissa Broome. In her article, Lissa L.
Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the
1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78, she argued for a restrictive interpre-
tation of § 547(c)(2) that would exclude payments on long-term debt from the scope of
that subsection. Id. at 82. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court rejected her position in
Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
I go beyond the position advocated by Professor Broome, however, and argue for the
repeal of § 547(c)(2) altogether. She seems to accept the incentive effect rationale for
that subsection. Broome, supra, at 117-20; see infra part IV(C)(1). The Wolas decision
eliminated Broome's approach as an alternative, making the course that I recommend
more of a necessity for those who believe that the equality paradigm should predominate
in the framing of preference law.
[Vol. 43
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ence liability. As long as section 547(c)(2) remains on the books in its
current form, it is difficult to justify having a preference law at all.
The wisdom and necessity of repeal have been heightened by the
Supreme Court's December 1991 decision in Union Bank v. Wolas.10 In
Wolas the Court held that section 547(c)(2) can apply to shield pay-
ments on long-term debt from preference recovery. 1 This holding was
not surprising, given the elimination of the forty-five day rule from sec-
tion 547(c)(2) in 198412 and the Supreme Court's recent proclivity to
10. 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991). The case was well known by the name "ZZZZ Best"
before the Supreme Court decision. ZZZZ Best Co., Inc. was the name of the debtor and
thus also the style of the Ninth Circuit decision that excluded payments on long-term
debt. Wolas v. Union Bank (In re ZZZZ Best Co.), 921 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub
nom. Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991). Recognizing, however, that future
discussion of this issue will focus on the Supreme Court decision, this Article will refer to
the case as Wolas (the name of the trustee who brought the preference action).
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wolas was a one-page per curiam opinion that relied
on the circuit's earlier decision in CHG International, Inc. v. Barclays Bank (In re CHG
International, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1990). The CHG International opinion by
Judge Hall examined the arguments for and against the application of § 547(c)(2) to
payments on long-term debt and determined that these payments were not protected by
that subsection.
The Sixth Circuit had held in Gosch v. Burns (In re Finn), 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir.
1990), that § 547(c)(2) could be applied to long-term debt. The Sixth Circuit relied heav-
ily on the plain language of that subsection after the 1984 amendment that deleted the
45-day limitation. The Supreme Court's decision in Wolas took a similar approach to
that of the Sixth Circuit.
The bases for the Court's decision in Wolas also were presented in an article pub-
lished just before the Court's decision was handed down. See Barkley Clark, Scheduled
Debt Payments as Preferences: Paradigm of the Plain Meaning Rule, 1 J. BANK& L. &
PRAC. 7 (1991). Clark argued that the Ninth Circuit's approach was wrong on nearly
every conceivable ground. Although I serve on the Editorial Advisory Board of the Jour-
nal in which Clark's article was published, I respectfully must disagree with the position
that he takes. Other commentators also favored the view that the subsection should ap-
ply to payments on long-term debt. See, e.g., David J. DeSimone, Section 547(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code: The Ordinary Course of Business Exception Without the 45 Day
Rule, 20 AKRON L. REV. 95, 129-31 (1986).
My sympathies lie much more closely with the views of Professor Lissa Broome, as
reflected in her excellent article, see supra note 9. Professor Broome argued that
§ 547(c)(2) should not be applied to long-term debt. Id. at 82.
11. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 533.
12. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, sec. 462(c), § 547(c)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 378. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying
text.
One article published shortly after the 1984 amendments suggested that "even a
slightly expansive reading of new section 547(c)(2) may have the practical effect of elimi-
nating preference liability for almost all payments to unsecured creditors." Dunham &
Price, supra note 9, at 500. However, the authors more optimistically suggested that
"[t]here are good reasons for believing that Congress did not intend to totally emasculate
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plain meaning holdings.3 At this juncture, repeal of section 547(c)(2)
may be the only viable way to forestall the virtually complete eviscera-
tion of the equality purpose of preference law14 that is threatened by
the 1984 amendments and the Wolas decision.
This assumes that equality is in fact a primary goal of preference
law. Under Wolas the goal of preserving "normal financial relations"' 5
swallows up any realistic supposition that equality matters. My view
that section 547(c)(2) deserves the fate of repeal predated Wolas, how-
ever, and stands independently of that decision.
Part II of the Article analyzes the principal policies of preference
law-equality and deterrence-and asserts that equality should be
given precedence. Part III details the historical development of the or-
dinary course safe harbor. In Part IV the Article explicates and criti-
cizes the justifications for the ordinary course exception. Finally, Part
V assesses the ramifications of repealing section 547(c)(2) and con-
cludes by arguing for that change in the law.
II, PURPOSES OF PREFERENCE LAW: THE PRIMACY OF EQUALITY OVER
DETERRENCE
To set the stage, consider a simple example. Assume that there is a
debtor D who has three trade creditors, imaginatively named A, B, and
C. Assume further that D owes each creditor $600 and that each debt
was incurred in the ordinary course of business. D, however, only has
$900 in assets. D therefore is insolvent within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code. 6 The day before D files a Chapter 11 case, D pays
creditor A in full, on ordinary business terms and during the normal
trade cycle (assume thirty days). D retains the other $300 to use in the
Chapter 11 case. Neither creditor B nor C is paid anything: Assume
that the Chapter 11 case fails (having consumed the last $300 of the
debtor's assets) and that the case is converted to Chapter 7. The trus-
tee then sues creditor A to recover the preferential payment.
Two ultimate results are possible. One is to let A keep the money.
This means that A would receive $600, and B and C would receive
nothing. The second is to make A give the money back. Then, the $600
13. See Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Con-
junctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
823, 879-81 (1992).
14. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177-78; infra part II.
15. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 373; infra part II.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (Supp. II 1990) ("[Tlhe sum of such entity's debts is
greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation."). This is the balance sheet
test. In the hypothetical the debtor also would be insolvent in the equity sense of inabil-
ity to pay its debts as they come due.
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would be distributed equally to A, B, and C, or $200 each. Preference
law is about making a choice between these two alternatives. To make
that choice requires the identification of the purposes that underlie
preference law.
Two rationales for preference law predominate: equality and de-
terrence. 17 The latter is sometimes cast in terms of the result suppos-
edly achieved by deterrence-namely maximization of the value of the
debtor's assets."8 These two policy goals conflict at times -as in the
case of an ordinary course transfer shortly before bankruptcy. The dis-
tinction between good and bad preferences follows naturally from the
identification of deterrence as the predominant purpose of preference
law. I assert that equality instead should be given ascendancy, and that
doing so leads to the conclusion that section 547(c)(2) should be
repealed.
Equality in this context means the pro rata treatment of creditors
who share the same priority claim to the debtor's assets.20 These are
the unsecured, nonpriority creditors. Secured creditors command
higher priority rights in their specific collateral than general creditors
under nonbankruptcy law, and this priority is theoretically honored by
bankruptcy law generally and by preference law specifically.21 Priority
creditors are unsecured creditors who, for a variety of policy reasons,
are paid before general creditors pursuant to section 507(a).22
17. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177-78.
18. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 261; Bruce R. Kraus, Note, Preferential Trans-
fers and the Value of the Insolvent Firm, 87 YALE L.J. 1449, 1450 (1978).
19. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 533 (1991).
20. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of
Section 547 of the Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 289, 292 (1980); Charles Seligson, Preferences
Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REV. 115, 115 (1961).
Professor Countryman quibbled that "no bankruptcy policy of 'equality' exists,"
pointing out that creditors are classified based on liens and priorities. Countryman,
supra note 9, at 748; see Morris, supra note 1, at 738. Professor Countryman concluded
that "[t]he function of the preference concept is to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that
distort the bankruptcy policy of distribution." Countryman, supra note 9, at 748.
Professor Countryman, as is usually the case, was correct. However, for similarly
situated creditors, the controlling bankruptcy distribution concept is equal treatment on
a pro rata basis. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1123(a)(4), 1322(a)(3) (1988). For conve-
nience, in this Article I use the term "equality" to describe in a shorthand way "the
bankruptcy policy of distribution."
21. A preference does not occur when a fully secured creditor gets paid because the
transfer does not enable the creditor to receive more than it would have in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding if the transfer had not been made. Thus, § 547(b)(5) is not satis-
fied. See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The priorities are strictly statutory.
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Outside of bankruptcy, unsecured creditors do not have a right to
an aliquot share of the debtor's unencumbered assets. Rather, the de-
fining characteristic of nonbankruptcy collection law is the race of dili-
gence-"first in time is first in right."23 The creditor who first obtains a
writ of execution and has the sheriff levy on the debtor's assets, or who
first garnishes the debtor's bank account, wins and gets paid before
less diligent creditors. Outside of a collective proceeding, then, a pref-
erence is not considered inherently evil.
2 4
This view is predicated, however, on the implicit assumption that
the debtor is solvent, i.e., that all creditors eventually will be paid in
full. If that assumption fails and the debtor is instead insolvent, the
fairness of a preference becomes much more questionable. In the event
of insolvency the payment of one creditor necessarily means not only
that other creditors will not get paid in full, but also that they will not
even receive a pro rata share of the debtor's already insufficient
assets.2 5
This result by itself does not necessarily require the conclusion
that a preference is a bad thing, even following insolvency. In theory,
in advance of anyone being paid, all creditors have an equal shot at
winning the race of diligence. Rewarding the more diligent creditors by
permitting them to keep the assets that they obtained might be justi-
fied as economically efficient, or under the equitable maxim that equity
rewards the vigilant.
One problem with this view is that the underlying assumption that
all creditors have an equal shot at winning the race is flawed. Some
creditors will have superior information about the prospects of the
debtor's impending insolvency, or better ability to move quickly to
grab the debtor's assets.2" In earlier times the practical advantage in
collecting that local creditors held over more distant creditors was seen
as providing a need for a preference recapture law. 7 Otherwise, the
extension of credit by geographically removed creditors would be chil-
led to the detriment of the economy. Still other creditors are more
likely to be paid first because the debtor wants to do so: the creditor
23. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (3d
ed. 1987); Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employ-
ment-for-Lawyers Bill (pt. 4-Avoiding Powers of the Trustee), 1980 UTAH L. REV. 19,
20.
24. See BAIRD, supra note 5, at 156; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 124.
25. See Aaron, supra note 23, at 38; McCoid, supra note 2, at 260; Charles Selig-
son, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and After-Ac-
quired Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 293 (1967).
26. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 125.
27. See James A. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L.
REv. 233, 234 (1946).
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may be a relative, or a business associate, or someone with whom the
debtor anticipates future dealings.
2 8
Another basic problem exists with the argument that favors up-
holding preferences made after the onset of insolvency. Doing so is in-
consistent with the fundamental tenet of equality of distribution that
undergirds a bankruptcy or other collective proceeding that deals with
an insolvent debtor.2 9 In a collective proceeding equality replaces the
nonbankruptcy law premise of race as the defining principle. This re-
sult may be justified on "common pool" grounds, 0 or on the funda-
mental premise that "equality is equity. '31 Whatever the rationale, the
model of equality in the collective proceeding unquestionably controls.
Saying that equality prevails in a collective proceeding does not
necessarily demand the conclusion that a like premise should be ex-
tended into the time period before the collective proceeding begins.
3 2
Many of the problems in casting preference law stem from the diffi-
culty of making the transition from the nonbankruptcy race paradigm
to the bankruptcy equality model. If insolvency and the collective pro-
ceeding (e.g., bankruptcy) occurred at the same instant, preference law
would be unnecessary.3 3 The race model, which may be justifiable for a
solvent debtor, would continue until insolvency occurred. At that junc-
ture equality would take over in the context of the collective
proceeding.
However, this convenient theoretical ordering of things does not
exist in real life. Insolvency almost always occurs before the collective
proceeding is commenced. Some creditors are paid during this transi-
tion period. Once the. existence of a transition period between the on-
set of insolvency and the commencement of a collective proceeding is
recognized, the need for choosing between the race and equality para-
digms arises.
The opt out theory, which is advanced primarily by Professors
Baird34 and Jackson,3 5 suggests a means for making that choice. This
theory assumes that some creditors may see the collective proceeding
coming before it actually occurs. Given this window of opportunity,
28. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 260 n.75.
29. See id. at 260-61.
30. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 125-26.
31. 2 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 405-412, at 144-
59 (5th ed. 1941); see Orelup, supra note 5, at 212 n.30. Professor Charles Seligson stated
the maxim the other way: "Equity is equality." Seligson, supra note 20, at 115.
32. See Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sec-
tions 547(c) (2), 550(a) (1), and 546(a) (1), 41 Bus. LAW. 175, 180 (1985).
33. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 124-25.
34. BAIRD, supra note 5, at 156.
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when the race model is still apparently in effect, but with equality
looming, it is only natural that those who see what is coming should try
to avoid its consequences and obtain a personal advantage s. 3 The per-
sonal advantage obtained is, however, contrary to the interests of the
creditor group as a whole. Thus, a way to restrain individual pursuit of
self-interest is needed.
3 7
The deterrence rationale therefore becomes important. The argu-
ment is that if preference law reaches back to recapture payments
made during this transition period, in which insolvency has occurred
but the collective proceeding has not yet been commenced, creditors
will be deterred from taking advantage of their superior knowledge. As
the argument goes, there is no advantage to be gained; therefore, it is
wasteful to engage in the collection process. Deterring parties who do
see the collective proceeding on the horizon from racing to grab the
debtor's assets theoretically will help the debtor stay in business 38 and
thereby increase the asset pool available for all creditors as a group.
Deterrence is effective, however, only against parties who are
aware of the debtor's financial distress and who therefore see the col-
lective proceeding coming. Innocent parties by definition will not be
deterred; the state of the preference law will have no impact on their
behavior. The logical leap that is then made is that recapture should
not be extended to these innocent parties because they would not be
deterred anyway. Apparently, for those lucky innocent creditors the
race model continues to apply until the actual commencement of the
collective proceeding.
I submit that the operative paradigm during the transition period
between the advent of insolvency and the filing of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding should be equality, not race. Whether preferred creditors
knowingly opted out or were just lucky should not be relevant to
whether they get to keep the preferential payment. Given this conclu-
sion, section 547(c)(2) loses much of its significance. The essential pre-
mise of a race-based collection system is the debtor's solvency. Once
insolvency is presumed, the race model loses its validity.
The foregoing argument for making deterrence the operative pre-
mise of preference law must withstand the initial criticism that deter-
rence does not work. A decade ago Professor McCoid questioned the
deterrent effect of preference law39; many others have agreed with
36. See id. at 124.
37. See Kraus, supra note 18, at 1453-54.
38. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177; Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527,
533 (1991).
39. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 263-65.
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him.40 An economically rational creditor usually will decide to take a
preference. The only sanction of the bankruptcy preference law is that
the preferred creditor has to return the money paid,41 thereby re-
turning to the status that it had before receipt of the preferential
transfer. The creditor then will receive the bankruptcy distribution
that it would have gotten without the preference. The only potentially
lost costs are those associated with receiving the preference in the first
place-for example, sheriff's fees and attorneys fees-and with defend-
ing a preference lawsuit, if the creditor chooses to do so.42
If recapture were absolutely certain, then deterrence might work,
given these transaction costs. However, recapture is not a certainty,
and the prudent creditor will discount that likelihood accordingly.
First, ninety-one days may elapse before the debtor files bankruptcy,
in which case the preference is secure unless the creditor is an in-
sider.43 Second, even if the debtor goes into bankruptcy within ninety
days, the trustee may not bring a preference action against the credi-
tor. Third, even if the trustee brings a preference action, the creditor
may prevail. Section 547(c)(2) further weakens the deterrence rationale
by making it much more likely that the preferred creditor will be al-
lowed to keep the preference.
The potential negative consequence that taking a preference may
drive the debtor out of business, thereby causing a possible loss on
other claims that the creditor might have against the debtor, or a loss
of future business, has no independent value because of bankruptcy
preference law. That risk would be the same even if there were no pref-
erence law or indeed no bankruptcy law. In theory, then, deterrence
should not work. Moreover, deterrence does not work in practice and
experience suggests that economic theory does work.
Furthermore, even if deterrence did serve to halt or at least slow
the race of diligence, giving deterrence precedence over equality still
would not be warranted. A basic notion of equity jurisprudence, apart
from the strictures of any particular bankruptcy law, is that the unen-
40. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 9, at 748; Kraus, supra note 18, at 1458;
Nimmer, supra note 20, at 292 n.9; see also Michael J. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the
Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 547(c)(1), (2) & (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U.
RiH. L. REv. 667, 696 (1983) ("[Rlationale is largely meaningless."). At least Professor
Herbert did not discriminate between policies. He went on to say, "The second rationale,
equality of distribution, is more complex although perhaps equally meaningless." Id.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
42. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 138. The creditor presumably will make a cost-
benefit analysis at the time of the suit to decide whether to defend or not. Therefore,
except for the costs that are connected with making that decision, it would not be proper
to add in any lawsuit costs with regard to the initial decision whether to take the
preference.
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cumbered assets of an insolvent debtor are held in trust for the benefit
of the entire body of unsecured creditors. After insolvency occurs those
creditors are the equitable owners of the debtor's assets, with their
ownership shares determined on a pro rata basis.
In a sense, then, a creditor who receives more than its pro rata
share of the debtor's assets after the debtor becomes insolvent has
taken property that equitably belongs to other creditors. If we feel the
need to ascribe some sense of moral blameworthiness to the preferred
creditor in order to justify disturbing the repose of settled transac-
tions, 14 then this basic fact should suffice. Note that the harm is ac-
complished even if the recipient is entirely innocent of any complic-
itous mens rea. An analogy may be made to the law of conversion,
which holds even an innocent converter liable for the value of the
property converted.
One also could question whether even a supposedly innocent credi-
tor really is so innocent, or whether in most cases the trustee simply
cannot prove that opt out behavior nevertheless is taking place. Much
the same problem existed with the old "reasonable cause to believe"
test. In every case some reason must explain why a few creditors are
preferred; preferences rarely occur by accident.
Along similar lines, we will see later that the ordinary course ex-
ception is often justified by the supposed normalcy of the transaction.
However, one may challenge the implicit assumption that any transfer
made by an insolvent debtor can be said to be in the ordinary course of
business. In the eyes of the commercial world, upon the occurrence of
insolvency the debtor has moved into a new, high risk category. Any
creditor who knows of the debtor's insolvency will make financial deci-
sions regarding that debtor on an entirely different basis than for a
solvent debtor."5 The heightened risk cannot be ignored.
Even more fundamentally, however, the unstated premise of the
deterrence rationale is that culpability somehow matters and that in-
nocence should therefore be rewarded. More than anything else, pref-
erence theory needs to shake off this antiquated morality notion and
embrace instead the equality principle. The 1977 House Report dis-
cussed below almost made this step, but unfortunately slipped, almost
inadvertently, back into the same old culpability game.
Concepts from early English bankruptcy law support the model of
"equality after insolvency" as the appropriate paradigm. In bank-
44. Professor Herbert cautioned against framing a preference policy on the basis of
"unanalyzed piety." Herbert, supra note 40, at 695. While perhaps my approach is in
some respects pietistic, at least I do not think that it is "unanalyzed."
45. Professor Herbert questioned whether § 547(c)(2) was even workable for this
reason. Id. at 692-94.
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ruptcy, pro rata distribution was, as it is now, the norm. However, the
English measured the operative time of the bankruptcy from when an
act of bankruptcy was committed, which predated the actual com-
mencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.4 Such an act of bankruptcy
signaled the debtor's insolvency.
We do not extend equality all the way back to the onset of insol-
vency, although that has been proposed. 47 The reason not to do so,
however, has nothing to do with the merits of the opt out argument, or
any deficiency in the equality principle. Rather, the independent policy
of repose in commercial transactions is effectuated by the ninety day
limitation in section 547(b)(4)(A). Within the ninety day period, when
repose is not given full effect, we should give equality primacy.
A preference rule favoring equality would be simpler and easier to
administer. Difficult issues regarding what is in the ordinary course
and the like, which promote so much costly litigation, would be elimi-
nated. Furthermore, and somewhat paradoxically, adopting a more ab-
solute equality rule would further deterrence by increasing the likeli-
hood of recapture.
The tension between the policies of equality and deterrence is evi-
denced starkly by the 1977 House Report, which accompanied an ear-
lier version of the bill that eventually became the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. That Report first appeared to establish equality of distri-
bution as the unquestioned preeminent goal:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting
the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short
period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the
courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.
The protection afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way
out of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his
creditors. Second, and more important, the preference provisions fa-
cilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater payment
than others of his class is required to disgorge it so that all may share
equally. The operation of the preference section to deter the "race of
diligence" of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy




The House Report further explained that this very primacy of the
46. See Garrard Glenn, The Diversities of the Preferential Transfer: A Study in
Bankruptcy History, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 521, 528 (1930); see infra note 63 and accompany-
ing text.
47. See Kraus, supra note 18, at 1459-60.
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equality policy necessitated the repeal of the Act's requirement that
preferences could be recaptured only if the trustee proved that the
creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent
at the time the transfer was made.4 9
This provision [reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insol-
vent] was designed when the primary purpose of the preference sec-
tion was to prevent the race of diligence. Whether or not a creditor
knows or believes that his debtor is sliding into bankruptcy is impor-
tant if the only purpose of the preference section is to deter the race.
However, a creditor's state of mind has nothing whatsoever to do with
the policy of equality of distribution, and whether or not he knows of
the debtor's insolvency does little to comfort other creditors similarly,
situated who will receive that much less from the debtor's estate as a
result of the prebankruptcy transfer to the preferred creditor. To ar-
gue that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a
preference and that creditors should not be required to disgorge what
they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bankruptcy
policy of equality among creditors. 0
As a normative matter I agree with the arguments just quoted
from the House Report. Equality is fairer and more equitable, it-is
more efficient, it makes more logical sense, and it is simpler and easier
to administer than fault-based theories of preference recovery. Unfor-
tunately, the above passages were not all that the House Report had to
say about preferences, and the Bankruptcy Code as enacted was not
true to the paradigm described in those excerpts. Rather, the ordinary
course safe harbor enacted as section 547(c)(2) undermines the equal-
ity principle, as discussed more fully below. The House Report justified
section 547(c)(2) as follows:
The second exception protects ordinary course of business. . . trans-
fers.. . . The purpose of this exception is to leave undisturbed normal
financial relations, because it does not detract from the general policy
of the preference section to discourage unusual action by either the
debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy.
51
In reading this explanation, one is left to wonder what happened
to the "strong bankruptcy policy of equality," of which absolutely no
mention is made. Instead, section 547(c)(2) is rationalized entirely on
the deterrence principle, which the same Report had earlier described
as secondary to equality. Regardless, the net effect is that, despite the
49. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, ch. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (1898) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Act of 1898]; see infra notes 169-78, 180-81 and accompanying text.
50. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 178.
51. Id. at 373.
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protestations to the contrary accompanying the explanation of the re-
peal of the reasonable cause to believe standard, deterrence ultimately
is given primacy over equality via the ordinary course of business
exception.
Yet, it is unlikely that Congress intended to effect such a result.
As Part III will show, the ordinary course exception must be under-
stood in light of the historical background against which it was en-
acted. That background shows a fairly clear intention to narrow the
scope of protection given to certain creditors and to promote more
strongly the equality goal. 2 Richard Levin, one of the drafters of the
1978 Code, stated that "[t]he goal of equality of distribution among
creditors becomes paramount," thereby reversing the situation from
that obtained under the Bankruptcy Act, in which "this goal was sec-
ondary to Congress' desire to preserve transactions that occur in the
ordinary course of business."53 It is to that historical background that I
now turn.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORDINARY COURSE SAFE
HARBOR
A. Early English Bankruptcy Preference Law
The distinction between good and bad preferences appears to have
originated in the middle of the eighteenth century in England. The
first English bankruptcy law, 34 & 35 Henry 8, chapter 4 in 1542,""
specified pro rata distribution of the bankrupt's assets to creditors. 55
That law did not specifically proscribe the giving of preferences, how-
ever. 8 The 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth, 7 the first comprehensive
English bankruptcy statute,5 likewise commanded pro rata distribu-
tion, but was silent on preferences.
As early as 1584, the making of a postbankruptcy preference was
denounced judicially by Lord Coke in The Case of Bankrupts (Smith
52. See Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In Defense of the Bankruptcy Code's
Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial Financing, 61 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 17-18 (1983).
53. Richard B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 173, 184 (1979).
54. An Act Against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupts, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch.
4 (Eng.); see Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 329 & n.21 (1991).
55. An Act Against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupts, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch.
4, § 1 (Eng.).
56. See Countryman, supra note 9; at 715.
57. 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.).
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v. Mills).5 Although in one sense the case is of limited value as a foun-
dation stone of preference law, since it did not involve a prebankruptcy
transfer to a creditor, it still bears mention because of some-of the
broader language used. On February 21, John Cook, the bankrupt,
transferred twenty-four pounds of his property in partial satisfaction
of a sixty-four pound debt to one creditor, Robert Tibnam. However,
four days earlier, on February 17, the Lord Chancellor had granted a
bankruptcy commission in response to a petition-filed by several credi-
tors on February 12. When the commissioners sold-the same goods, a
dispute over those goods arose. The holding was that the sale of the
commissioners was good and that the transfer by Cook to Tibnam was
void.60
Lord Coke first stated the overriding principle of equal
distribution:
So that the intent of the makers of the said Act [13 Eliz., chapter 7],
expressed in plain words, was to relieve the creditors of the bankrupt
equally, and that there should be an equal and rateable proportion
observed in the distribution of the bankrupt's goods amongst the
creditors, having regard to the quantity of their several debts ....11
He then extended that principle to distributions that the debtor
made after becoming bankrupt and before the actual commencement
of the bankruptcy proceeding: "[T]here ought to be an equal distribu-
tion . . . ; but if, after the debtor becomes a bankrupt, he may prefer
one . ..and defeat and defraud many other poor men of their true
debts, it would be unequal and unconscionable, and a great defect in
the law ... .62
Under English law a debtor became a bankrupt upon the commis-
sion of an act of bankruptcy, which predated (and indeed was the pre-
requisite to) the actual commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding
and the appointment of the bankruptcy commissioners. The bank-
ruptcy commissioners' title related back to the time of the act of bank-
ruptcy and voided transfers made by the debtor after that date.63
In 1623 the Statute of 21 James 164 appeared to make the giving of
a fraudulent preference (although the word "preference" was not used)
a criminal offense, for which the bankrupt would be pilloried for two
hours and have an ear cut off. The statute required that the convey-
ance be fraudulent or deceitful, in the amount of twenty pounds or
59. 76 Eng, Rep. 441 (K.B. 1584).
60. Id. at 441-58.
61. Id. at 464-68.
62. Id. at 473.
63, 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *486.
64. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 19, § 7 (1623) (Eng.).
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more, and "to the end and purpose to hinder the execution of this stat-
ute." 5 The focus, then, was on the intent of the debtor. This statute
did not provide for avoidance and recapture of the preference, how-
ever, but only imposed criminal liability.66
One cornerstone of the distinction between good and bad prefer-
ences was laid in 1746 in the Statute of 19 George 2.67 The preamble to
that statute indicated that then', as now, the distinction rested largely
on the perceived necessity of protecting ordinary course business trans-
actions involving creditors who were unaware of the debtor's financial
difficulties."' That statute created a safe harbor for creditors who the
debtor paid in the ordinary course of trade after the commission of an
act of bankruptcy but before the issuing of a bankruptcy commission.
Under the relation back doctrine, this was at that time the period of
vulnerability, although Lord Mansfield soon was to extend the credi-
tor's exposure into the time period immediately preceding the commis-
sion of the act of bankruptcy.6 9
The elements that had to be established for the creditor to come
within the statutory protection, which bear a striking resemblance in
some respects to section 547(c)(2) of the Code and in others to the
reasonable cause to believe test of section 60b of the 1898 Act, were:
(1) the claim had to arise in a bona fide credit transaction and in the
ordinary course of trade,70 (2) the payment had to be made in the ordi-
65. Id.
66. In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 671, 679 (W.D.N.Y. 1900).
67. 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32, § 1 (1746) (Eng.); see Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. at 682-83.
68. 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32, § 1 (1746) (Eng.). The preamble stated:
WHEREAS many persons within the description of, and liable to the statutes
concerning bankrupts, frequently commit secret acts of bankruptcy unknown
to their creditors and other persons, with whom, in the course of trade, they
have dealings and transactions; and after the committing thereof, continue to
appear publickly and carry on their trade and dealings, by buying and selling
of goods and merchandizes, drawing, accepting, and negociating bills of ex-
change, and paying and receiving money on account thereof, in the usual way
of trade, and in the same open and publick manner as if they were solvent
persons, and had not become bankrupt; and whereas the permitting such se-
cret acts of bankruptcy to avoid and defeat payments, really and bona fide
made in the cases, and under the circumstances above mentioned, where the
persons receiving the same had not notice of, or were privy to such persons
having committed any act of bankruptcy, will be a great discouragement to
trade and commerce, and a prejudice to credit in general.
Id.
69. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
70. 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32, § 1 (1746) (Eng.). The statute stated:
[N]o person who is or shall be really and bona fide a creditor of any bankrupt,
for or in respect of goods really and bona fide sold to such bankrupt, or for or
in respect of any bill or bills of exchange really and bona fide drawn, negoti-
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nary course of trade,71 and (3) the creditor had to not know or have
notice that the debtor at the time was bankrupt or in insolvent circum-
stances.72 Blackstone observed that this statute puts the law "upon a
more reasonable footing" and that "it would be prejudicial to trade to
carry this notion [of postbankruptcy recapture] to its utmost length."73
The preference recapture rule, as well as the exception just stated,
addressed only the time period after the commission of an act of bank-
ruptcy by the debtor. As noted above, this predated the actual filing of
a bankruptcy petition and the granting of the commission, of which
there was public notice, but nonetheless came after the onset of bank-
ruptcy. Thus, with the exception of one isolated decision in 1680, 74 the
law did not address the situation of a creditor who" was preferred.
before even the commission of an act of bankruptcy. However, Lord
Mansfield soon filled this gap.
In the 1758 case of Worsley v. Demattos,71 Lord Mansfield stated
in dictum that a transfer of all of the debtor's assets to a creditor im-
mediately before and in contemplation of bankruptcy was void and
constituted an act of bankruptcy. "Such preference would be a fraud
upon the whole bankrupt-laws, and defeat the two main ends of them:
which are, 1st. The right the creditors have to the management, and
disposal, of the bankrupt's estate, and effects. 2dly. An equal distribu-
tion amongst them."7 6
and dealing ....
Id. This element may be compared to § 547(c)(2)(A), which requires the debt to have
been incurred in the ordinary course of business.
71. Id. The statute required that the creditor receive the payment "before the su-
ing forth of such commission ... really and bona fide, and in the usual and ordinary
course of trade and dealing." This requirement mirrors § 547(c)(2)(B) and (C), which
require the payment to be made in the ordinary course of business and according to
ordinary business terms.
72. Id. The creditor had to receive the payment "before such time as the person
receiving the same shall know, understand, or have notice that he [the debtor) is become
a bankrupt, or that he is in insolvent circumstances." Id. This final element reflects the
requirement under § 60b of the 1898 Act that the creditor could be compelled to return a
preference only if it had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the
time of the transfer.
73. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *486. Blackstone compared this ap-
proach with that of France, where "every act of a merchant, for ten days precedent to
the act of bankruptcy, is presumed to be fraudulent, and is therefore void." Id. Thus, my
proposal in this Article agrees more with the position of the French in the middle of the
eighteenth century.
74. Hinton's Case, cited in JOHN LOWELL & JAMES A. LOWELL, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 64, at 44 & n.2 (1899).
75, 96 Eng. Rep. 1160 (K.B. 1758); see discussion of Worsley in In re Hall, 4 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 671, 680 (W.D.N.Y. 1900); LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 64, at 44-45;
McCoid, supra note 2, at 252.
76. Worsley, 96 Eng. Rep. at 1164.
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Even though the facts of the case involved the debtor's retention
of possession after the giving of the deed of his stock in trade, and thus
fraud under the famous Twyne's Case, Lord Mansfield's reasoning did
not depend on that circumstance: "Suppose, just before, and in con-
templation of an intended bankruptcy, such a deed, of all his effects,
was made, and possession instantly delivered, this would still be an
undue preference, and must be unjust, if not corrupt.M
77
A decade later that which had been presaged in Worsley was real-
ized in Alderson v. Temple,"8 which is "considered the leading case on
this subject ' 79 and in which Lord Mansfield struck down a preban-
kruptcy preferential transfer as void.8 At the same time, he made clear
that not all such transfers are vulnerable.81 Two strands of a preference
safe harbor appear. First, in the passage that the introduction to this
article quotes,82 he initiated the idea-still followed in England, but
abandoned in the United States'--that a preference given in response
to creditor pressure is valid . 4 Thus, a bad preference required an in-
tent on the part of the debtor to prefer the creditor to the wrong of
other creditors.8 Second, following the lead of the 1746 Statutes that
three years earlier Blackstone had affirmed as wise, 7 he recognized by
negative inference an exception for prebankruptcy transfers made in
the ordinary course of business. He stated that "a conveyance of all a
man's property in trade to pay a bona fide creditor of the most merito-
rious nature . . .is fraudulent .. .[biecause it is not an act in the
ordinary course of business .. .and it defeats the equality intended
by the law."88 Still later, he noted, "I am always diffident of hurting
the course of trade and commerce."8' 9
It has been remarked that "[tihe judges, not excepting Lord
77. Id. at 1165.
78. 96 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1768); see Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. at 679-80; LOWELL &
LOWELL, supra note 74, § 64, at 45-46; McCoid, supra note 2, at 251-53.
79. LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 64, at 45.
80. The debtor mailed a £600 note to one of his creditors on a Friday morning, and
then on Saturday morning "committed several acts of bankruptcy, upon which a com-
mission issued." Alderson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 385.
81. Id.; see Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. at 679-80.
82. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
83. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, pt. 2, 60.02[1], at 760-61 (James W. Moore et
al. eds., 14th ed. 1977); McCoid, supra note 2, at 252.
84. Alderson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 385.
85. See Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. at 680; McCoid, supra note 2, at 252-53.
86. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
88. Alderson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 385 (emphasis added); see 1 EDWARD E. DEACON, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE O BANKRUPTCY 609 (Albert G. Langley ed., 3d ed. London 1864);
Morris, supra note 1, at 739.
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Mansfield himself, appear to have been alarmed at their audacity in
establishing this new fraud, and they proceeded to confine it within
narrow and inadequate limits. They held that the course of trade must
not be interfered with .... .90
B. United States Preference Law in the Nineteenth Century Prior
to the 1898 Act
1. Prior to the Bankruptcy Act of 1841
At the time that the Bankruptcy Clause91 was included in the
United States Constitution, the English had developed a doctrine of
preferences that entailed not only recapture of prebankruptcy transfers
but also a safe harbor for ordinary course transfers. The first United
States bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,92 did not speak to
the question of preferences made prior to the commission of the act of
bankruptcy.9 3 The statute did contain a relation back rule, which gave
effect to assignments by the bankruptcy commissioners of the bank-
rupt's assets even as against persons who took from the bankrupt prior
to the commencement of the bankruptcy case but after the commission
of the act of bankruptcy."' However, the same section of the law con-
tained a safe harbor derived in spirit from the 1746 English statute and
exempted those who took from the bankrupt by bona fide purchase, for
a valuable consideration, and with no knowledge, information, or no-
tice of the act of bankruptcy.9
Some judicial decisions followed the English cases and permitted
the recapture of preferences." Justice Marshall in Harrison v. Sterry
97
voided an assignment that the debtor made shortly before bankruptcy.
Without any discussion of the English or any other authorities, he
stated:
It is made under circumstances which expose it to the charge of being
a fraud on the bankrupt laws.
90. LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 65, at 46.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ch. 4.
92. An Act to Establish an Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, ch, 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1800].
93. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 719; McCoid, supra note 2, at 253; Ward &
Shulman, supra note 52, at 5 n.2.
94. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 10, 2 Stat. 19, 24 (repealed 1803).
95. Id.
96. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 253 (citing Locke v. Winning, 3 Mass. 325
(1807)); Ward & Shulman, supra note 52, at 5 n.2 (citing Locke v. Winning, 3 Mass. 325
(1807)).
97. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
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[I]t is dated but a few days before their bankruptcy;. . . and is
made at a time when there is much reason to believe, from the face of
the deed, as well as from extrinsic circumstances, that such an event
was in contemplation.98
Here again the debtor's intent ("in contemplation"), which was derived
from the circumstances, appears to be determinative. Justice Marshall
did not specify exactly what it was that the debtor was in contempla-
tion of, bankruptcy or insolvency, a distinction which the courts grap-
pled with in the nineteenth century.9 9 Justice Marshall went on to note
that "[m]oney actually advanced upon the credit of this assignment,
subsequent to its date, might perhaps be secured by it."'10 0 This was an
early judicial recognition of the policy that is now embodied in the
subsequent advance exception of section 547(c)(4). However, he found
no evidence that any money actually had been' advanced upon the
assignment. 1 1
Following the 1803 repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,102 the
regulation of bankruptcy and insolvency was relegated to the states for
thirty-eight years. The most important state insolvency statute, in
terms of its impact on future federal bankruptcy legislation, is gener-
ally thought to be the Massachusetts Insolvency Law of 1838.103 The
Massachusetts law initially focused on the debtor's intention as the
critical element in defining a preference and required proof that the
debtor acted in "contemplation of insolvency" and with a "view "0 or
"intending to give a preference." 05 As discussed below, 08 in 1841 the
Massachusetts law added the requirement that "the creditor, when ac-
cepting such preference, [have] reasonable cause to believe such debtor
was insolvent." 107
Although the Massachusetts law was initially enacted before the
federal Bankruptcy Act of 1841, many of the important cases under
that Massachusetts law came after the repeal of the 1841 Act in 1843.
The judicial decisions under the federal act and the Massachusetts law
98. Id. at 301.
99. See LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 69, at 49-50.
100. Harrison, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 301.
101. Id.
102. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
103. Insolvency Law of 1838, ch. 163, 1838 Mass. Acts; see In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 671, 684 (W.D.N.Y. 1900); LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 66, at 47; McCoid,
supra note 2, at 254-56.
104. Insolvency Law of 1838, ch. 163, § 10, 1838 Mass. Acts.
105. Act of Mar. 18, 1841, ch. 124, § 3, 1841 Mass. Acts. For additional discussion on
the impact of the Massachusetts law, see McCoid, supra note 2, at 255-56.
106. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
107. Act of Mar. 18, 1841, ch. 124, § 3, 1841 Mass. Acts, quoted in McCoid, supra
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therefore informed each other. In one well-known 1848 case, Denny v.
Dana,10 s the Massachusetts court held that intent to prefer could be
inferred from the fact that the debtor knew he was insolvent:
The intent to prefer is essential, but every person is to be presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his own acts; and if
such acts do, in fact, as this does, give a very large preference, it is
competent for the jury to infer the intent. It does not rebut this in-
tent, to show that the debtor has also another motive to the proceed-
ing, namely, an expectation of pecuniary or other future benefit to
himself, by means of further loans of money, and being enabled
thereby to continue his business. 09
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841
The first federal bankruptcy statute that directly addressed the
question of preferences was the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.110 Section 2
defined preferences, provided for their recapture, barred the discharge
of a person making such a preference, and established a safe harbor for
certain transactions more than two months before bankruptcy."' Refe-
ree Hotchkiss observed in a lengthy opinion written in 1900 that de-
tailed the history of the preference law: "It will at once be seen that
108, 56 Mass, (2 Cush.) 160 (1848).
109. Id. at 172; see LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 71, at 52-53; McCoid, supra
note 2, at 255-56.
110. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1841].
111. Id. § 2, 5 Stat. at 422. Section 2 provided in part:
And be it further enacted, That all future payments, securities, conveyances,
or transfers of property, or agreements made or given by any bankrupt, in con-
templation of bankruptcy, and for the purpose of giving any creditor, endorser,
surety, or other person, any preference or priority over the general creditors of
such bankrupts; and all other payments, securities, conveyances, or transfers of
property, or agreements made or given by such bankrupt in contemplation of
bankruptcy, to any person or persons whatever, not being a bona fide creditor
or purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice, shall be deemed ut-
terly void, and a fraud upon this act; and the assignee under the bankruptcy
shall be entitled to claim, sue for, recover, and receive the same as part of the
assets of the bankruptcy; and the person making such unlawful preferences
and payments shall receive no discharge under the provisions of this act: Pro-
vided, That all dealings and transactions by and with any bankrupt, bona fide
made and entered into more than two months before the petition filed against
him, or by him, shall not be invalidated or affected by this act: Provided, That
the other party to any such dealings or transactions had no notice of a prior
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this definition was an inartistic jumble of the then English definition of
preference with those sections of the English law which took innocent
transactions which accomplished 'preferences,' but not 'fraudulent
preferences,' out from the ban of the law." '112
As with the Massachusetts Insolvency Law, the critical element of
a voidable preference under the 1841 Act was the intention of the
debtor. Section 2 required proof that the debtor acted "in contempla-
tion of bankruptcy, and for the purpose of giving [a] preference." 1 3 A
nineteenth century commentator noted that "[t]he words 'in contem-
plation of bankruptcy,' as used in the bankrupt law, mean a contem-
plation of a state of bankruptcy merely, and not an intention to take
the benefit of the bankrupt law."M"
4
The case law interpreting the statute, with many of the important
decisions by Justice Story, indicated that the debtor's intent to prefer
and "contemplation" would be judged largely on the objective facts ap-
parent to the debtor.115 As one commentator said, "If a debtor is insol-
vent, and knows it, his intent t6 prefer may be presumed."" However,
the decisions were far from uniform on this point."17 The English rule
that creditor pressure validated the preference"" was not followed."'
No outside statutory time limit was placed on the preference reach
back,'20 except for the two month safe harbor mentioned below. As
long as the necessary intention of the debtor could be proved, recap-
ture was possible. Of course, as a practical matter, the more distant the
bankruptcy became, the more difficult the proof became.
The only relevance of the creditor's state of mind was with regard
to the safe harbor for transactions more than two months before the
bankruptcy filing.' 2' Within the two months the focus was entirely on
the debtor. In addition to the requirement that those transactions be
"bona fide made and entered into" (reminiscent of section
112. In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 671, 684 (W.D.N.Y. 1900).
113. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843).
114. EDWARD AVERY & GEORGE M. HOBBS, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 257 (1868).
115. For the cases and a discussion, see LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 71, at
52; Glenn, supra note 46, at 535-37; McCoid, supra note 2, at 253-54.
116. LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 73, at 56.
117. See AVERY & HOBBS, supra note 114, at 253-58 (discussing different interpreta-
tions of "contemplation of bankruptcy" and "contemplation of insolvency").
118. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
119. See Glenn, supra note 46, at 535-37.
120. Some modern commentators advocate returning to this system which eschews
an arbitrary time limitation. See Kraus, supra note 18, at 1458; see supra note 47 and
infra note 283 and accompanying text.
121. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843); see Mc-




Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
547(c)(2)(A)), the exclusion in section 2 contained a proviso that the
creditor must have "had no notice of a prior act of bankruptcy, or of
the intention of the bankrupt to take the benefit of this act.
122
3. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867
Almost a quarter century after the 1841 Act was repealed in
1843,123 Congress again exercised its power under the Bankruptcy
Clause in enacting the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.124 This Act contained
in section 35125 the most detailed statutory provision dealing with pref-
erences to date and in section 39128 for the first time12 made the giving
of a preference an act of bankruptcy that would support an involun-
tary bankruptcy proceeding. These two sections were construed in pari
materia.12s The preference provisions of the 1867 Act seem to be de-
rived much more directly from the Massachusetts Insolvency Law than
from the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.129
In the 1867 Act a number of threads of preference law are brought
together. In a sense, that Act serves as the bridge between the earliest
notions of preference law and those obtaining in more recent times.
First, consistent with all prior preference rules, legislative or judicial, a
wrongful intent on the part of the debtor was required. Section 35 re-
quired the debtor to have acted "with a view to give a preference." 1"
122. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843).
123. An Act to Repeal the Bankrupt Act, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
124. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed 1878) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1867].
125. Id. § 35, 14 Stat. at 534. Section 35 provided in part:
And be it further enacted, That if any person, being insolvent, or in contem-
plation of insolvency, within four months before the filing of the petition by or
against him, with a view to give a preference to any creditor or person having a
claim against him, or who is under any liability for him, procures any part of
his property to be attached, sequestered, or seized on execution, or makes any
payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance of any part of his prop-
erty, either directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditionally, the person receiv-
ing such payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance, or to be bene-
fited thereby, or by such attachment, having reasonable cause to believe such
person is insolvent, and that such attachment, payment, pledge, assignment, or
conveyance is made in fraud of the provisions of this act, the same shall be
void, and the assignee may recover the property, or the value of it, from the
person so receiving it, or so to be benefited ..
Id.
126. Id. § 39, 14 Stat. at 536.
127. See In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 671, 684 (W.D.N.Y. 1900).
128. ORLANDO F. BuMP, LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY 398 (1871).
129. See Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. at 684; LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 66, at
47; McCoid, supra note 2, at 254-58.
130. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878).
[Vol. 431004
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As under the 1841 Act, the great majority of the cases focused on
objective circumstances known to the debtor in assessing whether the
debtor acted "with a view to give a preference."'" This objective ap-
proach was confirmed emphatically by the Supreme Court in 1871 in
Toof v. Martin. 
1 2
That the conveyances to Toof, Phillips & Co. were made with a
view to give them a preference over other creditors hardly admits of a
doubt. The bankrupts knew at the time their insolvent condition....
Making a transfer of property to these creditors, under these circum-
stances, was in fact giving them a preference, and it must be pre-
sumed that the bankrupts intended this result at the time. It is a gen-
eral principle that every one must be presumed to intend the
necessary consequences of his acts. The transfer, in any case, by a
debtor, of a large portion of his property, while he is insolvent, to one
creditor, without making provision for an equal distribution of its pro-
ceeds to all his creditors, necessarily operates as a preference to him,
and must be taken as conclusive evidence that a preference was in-
tended, unless the debtor can show that he was at the time ignorant of
his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that he could reasonably
expect to pay all his debts. The burden of proof is upon him in such a
case ....131
Under this construction of the statute, the requirement of debtor
intent had little vitality independent of the insolvency test. A leading
commentator observed that "the decisions under the Act placed a min-
imum emphasis upon such intent [of the debtor] .'13" This state of af-
fairs finally was given statutory recognition in the 1898 Act, which dis-
pensed entirely with proof of any element of debtor intent.136
Section 35 also required that the debtor either actually be insol-
vent, or act "in contemplation of insolvency.""13 This formulation dis-
pensed with the mens rea relating to insolvency entirely if the debtor
in fact was in that state,"" thus beginning a transition completed in
the 1898 Act."81 It also shifted what the debtor had to be in contempla-
tion of from "bankruptcy" under the 1841 law to "insolvency" under
the 1867 Act. The decisions viewed these as materially distinct
131. See cases digested in Bump, supra note 128, at 402-04.
132. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 40 (1871).
133. Id. at 48.
134. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, 60.05[1], at 771.
135. See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
136. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878).
137. See Bump, supra note 128, at 400.
138. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60a, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978);
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inquiries. 39
The 1867 Act effected a shift from the early English decisions and
from the 1841 Act by imposing an absolute four month limit before
bankruptcy on the period of vulnerability.140 In 1874 this period was
reduced to two months for involuntary cases.' 41 In England, as men-
tioned earlier, all transfers made after commission of the act of bank-
ruptcy were potentially at risk.", The English 1746 safe harbor statute
had been cast in terms of the bona fides of the transaction and lacked
any specific time bar.4 3 Lord Mansfield had spoken only of "the eve of
bankruptcy.' 44 The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 contained a two month
provision. However, the exclusion was not absolute and depended both
on the bona fides of the transaction and the recipient's lack of notice of
anything suspect." 5 This innovation of the 1867 law, as with many
other aspects of it, apparently was copied from the Massachusetts stat-
ute.' 48 An absolute time limit has been a part of all United States pref-
erence laws since 1867.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 added another component to the
preference equation, again borrowed from Massachusetts"47 : the re-
quirement that the creditor recipient of the preference have reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the trans-
fer, and that the payment was "made in fraud of the provisions of this
act.'" 4s Creditor knowledge had never before been considered a factor
in defining a preference, except to the limited extent relevant for the
two-month safe harbor under the 1841 law."49 Indeed, the English view,
adhered to unfailingly ever since Alderson v. Temple'50 in 1768, was
that a preference given in response to creditor pressure was not volun-
tary on the part of the debtor and thus not fraudulent.1'5
139. See BuMP, supra note 128, at 398.
140. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878).
141. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, sec. 10, § 35, 18 Stat. 178, 180 (repealed 1878).
142. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *485-86.
143. 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32, § 1 (1746) (Eng.).
144. Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (K.B. 1768).
145. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843); see supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
146. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 259. The time limit in Massachusetts was six
months. See Act of Mar. 18, 1841, ch. 124, § 3, 1841 Mass. Acts.
147. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 257-58; see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying
text.
148. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878).
149. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843); see supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
150, 96 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (K.B. 1768); see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying
text.
151, See DEACON, supra note 88, at 607.
1006 [Vol. 43
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The introduction in 1867 of the requirement that the creditor have
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent perhaps more
than any other event led to the direct consideration by judges of the
issue of whether the payment had occurred in the ordinary course of
business as relevant to. the preference determination. Section 35 of the
1867 law had an express provision stating that "if such sale, assign-
ment, transfer, or conveyance is not made in the usual and ordinary
course of business of the debtor, the fact shall be prima facie evidence
of fraud.?'1s2 The manner of phrasing this statutory presumption sug-
gests, the negative inference that transfers that were made in the
"usual and ordinary course of business" should be presumed prima fa-
cie to be valid; the cases under the 1867 law in fact made that
inference.'53
Judge Lowell, writing before the passage of the 1898 Act, 54 dis-
cussed the impact of proof that the transfer was in the "usual course of
business" as relevant to a showing that the debtor did or did not have
the requisite intent to prefer. 55 He also suggested that such evidence
bears on proof of creditor's knowledge. He observed:
In England, as we have seen, payment and security given in the ordi-
nary course of trade are protected. In this country, intent is a question
of fact; and while a payment in the ordinary course of trade will rarely
be a preference, yet it may happen to be so in some cases. On the
other hand, an act done out of the usual course of the debtor's busi-
ness is, by most of the statutes, and would be by decision, notice to
the preferred creditor that something may be wrong. 6'
C. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and Amendments
The preference avoidance and recovery provisions in section 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898's' completed and carried forward many of
the transitional ideas and innovations introduced in the 1867 Act.
First, the requirement that the debtor have an intent to prefer the
creditor, present but often almost meaningless in the 1867 Act,6 8 was
finally and formally abandoned in section 60,1'9 although not without
152. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878).
153. For a collection of these cases, see BUMP, supra note 128, at 406-07 (especially
Driggs v. Moore, Foote & Co., Collins v. Bell, and Scammon v. Cole).
154. See LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, preface.
155. Id. § 74, at 56-57. The title to § 74 is "Intent, continued; Usual Course of Busi-
ness." Id. at 56.
156. Id. § 74, at 56-57.
157. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stait. 544, 562 (1898) (repealed 1978).
158. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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confusion. 160 Although section 3a(2) continued to require the debtor's
intent to prefer for a preference to constitute an act of bankruptcy, 161
no such intent was included in section 60, and the Supreme Court re-
fused to infer such a requirement. 62 After amendments to sections 57g
and 60 in 1903,163 some courts mistakenly imposed a debtor intent re-
quirement for avoidance and recovery of preferences. 64 Further
amendments in 1910165 corrected this judicial error, and debtor intent
in connection with preference recapture has not been required since.'66
The 1898 Act further limited recovery to situations in which the
debtor in fact was "insolvent" at the time of the transfer. 67 The alter-
native proof available under the 1867 Act, that the debtor acted "in
contemplation of insolvency,"'6 8 was discarded. Thus the "contempla-
tion" provision' finally passed out of the bankruptcy law.
At the same time, two prerequisites to recovery of a preference
that were first introduced in 1867 were continued in section 60b of the
1898 Act: the requirement of a bad state of mind on the part of the
recipient creditor, and a four month limit on the preference
reachback.'69 The creditor knowledge requirement was altered slightly
McCoid, supra note 2, at 256-57.
This step appears to have been taken at the instigation of the Senate because the
bill proposed by the House retained the element of debtor intent. H.R. REP. No. 65, 55th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1897). The Conference Report, S. Doc. No. 294, 55th Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1898), struck that language, without explanation.
160. For example, James Lowell, updating his father's treatise after the passage of
the 1898 Act, concluded, "By considering paragraphs a and b [of § 60] together it will
appear that in order that the transfer or judgment may be set aside by the trustee, it
must have been given with an intent to prefer." LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 523,
at 480.
161. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3a(2), 30 Stat. 544, 546. This requirement of
intent to prefer as part of the definition of a preference as an act of bankruptcy was
finally repealed in 1952. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, sec. 3(a), § 3a, 66 Stat. 420, 421.
162. Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1901).
163. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, secs. 12-13, §§ 57g, 60, 32 Stat. 797, 799-800.
164. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, 5 60.05[2.2], at 773-74.
165. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, sec. 11, § 60b, 36 Stat. 838, 842. As Professor
Countryman observed, this amendment "eliminated the anomaly of section 60b's re-
quirement that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor had an intent
that section 60a did not require the debtor to have." Countryman, supra note 9, at 722.
166. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, 1 60.05[2.3], at 775; 4 HAR-
OLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1703, at
323 (James M. Henderson ed., 1957); Countryman, supra note 9, at 723; see also HENRY
C, BLACK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY § 259, at 621 (2d ed.
1930).
167. Bankruptcy Act of 18984 ch. 541, § 60a, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978).
168. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878); see
supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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from the 1867 test demanding knowledge that the debtor was "insol-
vent" 0 to the 1898 section 60b test that the creditor "shall have had
reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a pref-
erence."'' In 1910 this was amended to "reasonable cause to believe
that the enforcement of such judgment or transfer would effect a pref-
erence" 1 2 in order to eliminate the misconstruction that debtor intent
must be proven.
1 7 1
The change from the 1867 version to 1898 is not explained in the
House Report 7 4 or the Conference Report. 7 5 Perhaps the difference
was not too great. Judge Lowell, writing before the 1898 Act was
passed, noted that "cause to believe insolvency proves cause to believe
the intent to prefer."' " Henry Black, writing after 1898 but before the
1938 amendments, also concluded that "[i]f the creditor knows or has
reasonable ground to believe that the debtor is insolvent, then it may
be inferred without further proof that he also has reasonable ground to
believe that the enforcement of the judgment or transfer which he
takes will effect a preference.' 7 7 In the major 1938 revision, Congress
went back to the 1867 test, which required "reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor is insolvent."'' 7 The test remained in that form until it
was repealed along with the rest of the Bankruptcy Act in 1978.
The 1898 Act did not contain a provision like that of the 1867 Act
which expressly provided that proof that a transfer was "not made in
the usual and ordinary course of business" created a presumption of
fraud.279 In part, this may be attributable to the elimination of any
As originally enacted, the preference surrender provision of § 57g referred only to
"creditors who have received preferences." Id. § 57g, 30 Stat. at 560. Section 60a, which
defined "preferences," said nothing about the four-month and reasonable cause to be-
lieve tests, which applied only to avoidance and recovery of the preference under § 60b.
The Supreme Court held in Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901), that
the statute meant what it said, namely that a preference taken by a creditor who lacked
reasonable cause to believe a preference was intended had to be surrendered under § 57g
before the creditor could prove its claim. Id. at 447-55. Section 57g was amended in 1903
to change this result, so that only the surrender of preferences voidable under § 60b was
required as a prerequisite to proving a claim. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, sec. 12, § 57g,
32 Stat. 797, 799.
170. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878).
171. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978).
172. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, sec. 11, § 60b, 36 Stat. 838, 842.
173. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
174. HR. REP. No. 65, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1897).
175. S. Doc. No. 294, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1898).
176. LOWELL & LOWELL, supra note 74, § 99, at 79. Judge Lowell went on to note
that "the unusual character of the transaction is such evidence." Id.
177. BLACK, supra note 166, § 260, at 622.
178. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938) (repealed 1978).
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element of debtor intent, and a corresponding deemphasis on the
fraudulent nature of a preference. Nevertheless, as under the 1867 law,
ordinary course transactions still tended to escape recapture, on sev-
eral theories.
One way that ordinary course payments were protected was
through the operation of the reasonable cause to believe test of section
60b.s0 Collier stated:
Payments received by a creditor in the ordinary course of busi-
ness with an insolvent debtor are not necessarily voidable. The ac-
ceptance of payments with no special purpose of obtaining advantage
over other creditors but in accordance with the creditor's general
method of collecting outstanding accounts will not give rise to reason-
able cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.1 81
Another justification for excluding certain ordinary course trans-
fers from the reach of the preference section was on the ground that
the payment was for a "current expense" '182 and that in essence no de-
pletion or diminution of the debtor's estate was accomplished thereby.
This diminution notion was considered "implicit in the very nature of
a preference"18 3 and also implied from the antecedent debt require-
ment.8" The payment of these "current expenses" was protected from
preference recapture on the same theoretical grounds as cash transac-
tions.186 The extension of the credit and the payment were seen as in
substance "one transaction,"188 even though technically for an antece-
supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
180. See Broome, supra note 9, at 89; DeSimone, supra note 10, at 104; Herbert,
supra note 40, at 679; Morris, supra note 1, at 762.
181. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, 60.54[4], at 1082.1.
182. See DeSimone, supra note 10, at 104; Ward & Shulman, supra note 52, at 19-
20.
183. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, V 60.20, at 856-57.
184. Id. at 858-59; Broome, supra note 9, at 90 & n.68.
185. Collier stated:
[W]here the debtor engages in a cash transaction whereby he purchases goods
and pays a reasonable sum for them, such payment does not constitute a pref-
erence under § 60. Obviously in such a situation there is no depletion of the
debtor's estate for an antecedent debt. Similarly payments on account of cur-
rent expenses incidental to the operation of a business are generally not
within the category of preferential transfers.
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, % 60.23, at 872-73 (emphasis added).
Professors Ward and Shulman referred to these as "like-cash" transactions. Ward &
Shulman, supra note 52, at 18 n.45.
186. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, pt. 2, 60.19, at 851-53. According to
Collier:
[S]uch a transfer of property by the debtor does not necessarily effect a prefer-
ence . . .where it appears that there was but one transaction .... In the
same category also are advancements upon security for current business opera-
1010 (Vol. 43
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dent debt.18 7 Many commentators believe that this judicially developed
current expense concept led at least in part to section 547(c)(2).1
8
Most of the decisions under the Act which held that payments in the
ordinary course were not preferential are entitled to substantially less
historical and precedential weight in defining and framing our own
preference policy than might appear at first blush. This is due to the
fact that many of those cases were not recapture cases under section 60
or even surrender cases under section 57g, but rather were asking only
whether the debtor had made a preference that would qualify as an act
of bankruptcy sufficient to support an involuntary petition under sec-
tion 3a.'89 Under section 3a the debtor's intent to prefer was required
until 1952.10 That a transfer was made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness might well be relevant to prove that the debtor lacked an intent to
prefer. Our current law has, however, rejected any notion that the
debtor's intent should be relevant to whether a preference should be
recovered.
Only "a smattering of cases"'' actually held that ordinary course
is relevant to disprove a preference under section 60a (as opposed to an
act of bankruptcy under section 3a or the section 60b reasonable cause
test). As Professor Countryman observed, they did so "with no help
from, or regard for, the language of the statute."' 9 The main case gen-
erally cited is Marshall v. Florida National Bank,'93 in which $1356.11
in warehouse storage charges was paid during the preference period.
The court declined to find a preference, reasoning that the payment
had been in the "usual course of business" and had actually benefited
tions, or expenses. Likewise, payments of currently earned wages are not pref-
erential in this respect, inasmuch as the labor performed constitutes a present
consideration; and current payments of rent may be said to rest on a present
consideration.
Id.
187. See Morris, supra note 1, at 762-63. Professor Morris observed that "courts
have often had the good sense to avoid analyzing transactions on such a minute time
scale. Multiple acts are looked upon as a single transaction." Id. at 763.
188. See infra note 238 and accompanying text. See Broome, supra note 9, at 89-91;
Countryman, supra note 9, at 767-69; Herbert, supra note 40, at 679; Michael Kaye,
Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 201-02 (1980).
189. See, e.g., In re E.T. Russell Co., 291 F. 809, 812-15 (D. Mass. 1923); In re
Perlhefter, 177 F. 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); In re Douglas Coal & Coke Co., 131 F. 769,
775-76 (E.D. Tenn. 1904).
190. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
191. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 768 & n.296; see also Broome, supra note 9,
at 90 & n.68.
192. Countryman, supra note 9, at 768.





Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the debtor's estate. 19' To extrapolate the handful of cases decided over
eighty years into a well-recognized judicial exception to preference re-
capture, as Collier did,195 may well have been unwarranted.
D. The Bankruptcy Commission Report
In 1970 Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recom-
mend changes to" the Bankruptcy Act.""' The Commission filed its re-
port in 1973, together with a draft "Bankruptcy Act of 1973.' 9 7 The
Commission recommended a "substantial revision" of the preference
section.108
Most notably, the Commission proposed that the reasonable cause
to believe test be abolished.19 9 Congress made this significant change in
the 1978 Code.200 Abolition of the reasonable cause test, however,
which had provided safety to many creditors under the Act, was
thought to require some countervailing measures to ameliorate the im-
pact of that action. 01 One was to shorten the time period of vulnerabil-
ity to ninety days, from four months.
202
The other was with regard to ordinary course transfers, previously
protected in most instances by the reasonable cause test.203 The Com-
mission recommended a narrowly tailored exclusion from preference
recapture, to be accomplished through the definition of "antecedent
debt" in section 4-607(g)(1) of the proposed Act.2 0 Professor Country-
194. Marshall, 112 F.2d at 381-82. The court stated:
[Playment of the storage charges was vital if the preserving company was to
continue its business.. . . The payment to the warehouse company in no wise
diminished the assets of the company, but on the other hand conserved the
valuable merchandise which might have been advertised and sold for meager
storage fees.
Id.
195. See supra note 185.
196. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
197. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I (report), pt. II (Bankruptcy Act of 1973) (1973)
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
198. Id. pt. 1, at 201.
199. Id. at 201-02, 204. The Commission Report stated that the reasonable cause
"requirement, more than any other, has rendered ineffective the preference section of
the present Act." Id. at 204.
200. See HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 178.
201. See Nutovic, supra note 32, at 178.
202. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 197, pt. II, at 170 n.10 ("The reduction
moderates the effect of eliminating the 'reasonable cause to believe' requirement.").
203. See id. at 169-70 n.6; see supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
204, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 197, pt. II, § 4-607(g)(1), at 168. It stated:
[Vol. 431012
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man asserted that the Commission proposal was "an apparent attempt
both to confine the earlier rulings under section 60 and to provide
them with some statutory base."20 5 All transfers within five days of the
incurring of the debt were excluded, 08 following on the one transaction
theory. Furthermore, all debts for personal services were excluded, as
were debts for utilities incurred within the preference period and debts
for inventory paid within three months of delivery in the ordinary
course of business.
20 7
In a rather conclusory manner0 8 the Commission justified the lat-
ter exclusions on the ground that payment of those debts "does not
infringe substantially on the goals of the preference provisions."2 ' The
Commission apparently was drawing heavily on an article by Professor
Robert Morris.2 10 That article discussed the, problem that a strict inter-
pretation of "antecedent debt" could, without the reasonable cause
test, render preferential many routine transactions that in actuality are
not thought of as extensions of credit.2 11 Professor Morris accordingly
recommended a grace period for all preferences. 2 12 The Commission
noted that the reasonable cause to believe test previously protected
most of those transfers,1 3 but it was also recommending the abolition
of that test for transfers within the three month preference period.1 4
The National Bankruptcy Conference criticized the Commission
proposal as both too rigid and as providing too long a grace period.1 0
It would have limited the protection to debts incurred within thirty
days of payment.216 The theory of protection was basically the same;
only the particulars were disputed.
"Antecedent debt" is a debt incurred more than five days before a transfer
paying or securing the debt. "Antecedent debt" does not include (A) a debt for
personal services; (B) a debt for utilities incurred within three months of the
petition; (C) a debt for inventory paid for within three months of the delivery
of the goods in the ordinary course of the debtor's business .
Id.
205. Countryman, supra note 9, at 768.
206. See supra note 204.
207. See id.
208. See Nutovic, supra note 32, at 179.
209. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 197, pt. I, at 205.
210. See id. pt. II, at 169-70 n.6 (citing Morris, supra note 1).
211. See Morris, supra note 1, at 761-68.
212. Id.
213. COMMISSON REPORT, supra note 197, pt. II, at 170 n.6.
214. Id. pt. I, at 201, 204.
215. See Broome, supra note 9, at 97 n.97; Countryman, supra note 9, at 768.
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E. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The recommendation of the Bankruptcy Commission was not fol-
lowed precisely in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The proposal to
repeal the reasonable cause to believe test for transfers within the
three month period was adopted. That test was seen as antithetical to
the overriding preference purpose of promoting equality.217
However, the shape of the protection for short-term ordinary
course transfers was different. Congress in 1978 settled on the ordinary
course exception of section 547(c)(2), which eschewed specification of
categories of debt (e.g., personal services, utilities, and inventory)
21
and instead imposed the limitations of "ordinary course" and that pay-
ment be within forty-five days after the debt was incurred.211 Professor
Broome's examination of the mark-up minutes of the House subcom-
mittee staff indicated that the principal concern, as under the current
expense rule and the Commission Bill, still was with protecting the
payment of ordinary trade debts that were "'not truly antecedent.' ,122o
The House Report itself was more vague, stating that the purpose
of the exception was "to leave undisturbed normal financial rela-
tions. ' '2 1 Accompanied by the forty-five day limitation, however, to-
gether with the repeal of the reasonable cause test, the intended effect
of the 1978 Code nevertheless was to narrow the scope of excepted
payments from that under the Act and to make the goal of equality
217. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177-78; see supra notes 49-50, 52-53 and
accompanying text.
218. Those excluded from the list of preference exceptions in the Commission Bill
not surprisingly complained that they were being unfairly discriminated against. See
Nutovic, supra note 32, at 179.
219. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547(c)(2), 92 Stat. 2549,
2598 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988)). Specifically, § 547(c)(2) provided:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or finan-
cial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
Id.
220, Broome, supra note 9, at 98 n.97 (quoting Minutes of the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
552 (1977) (statement of Mr. Klee)); see also Ward & Shulman, supra note 52, at 23 &
nn. 65-66.
221. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 373; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
1014 [Vol. 43
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F. The 1984 Amendments and Wolas
Trouble developed fairly quickly with the ordinary course excep-
tion under the Bankruptcy Code, on two fronts. First, the courts ran
into considerable difficulty in applying the forty-five day limitation.
223
The expressed goal of "a reduction in litigation and more efficient ad-
ministration ' 224 was not being fully realized. Second, the limitation
was assailed as unfairly discriminatory against creditors with a trade
cycle longer than forty-five days 225 and as undermining the market for
short-term commercial paper.
2 26
After considering a wide variety of alternatives,227 Congress ulti-
mately responded to these various complaints in 1984 by repealing the
forty-five day limitation in section 547(c)(2)(B). 22 An interesting collo-
quy between Senators Dole and DeConcini was inserted into the Con-
gressional Record to bolster the view that payment of short-term com-
mercial paper at maturity now would be protected under section
547(c)(2). 229 Repealing the forty-five day limitation, however, went far
222. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177-78; Levin, supra note 53, at 183-84;
see supra note 217 and accompanying text.
223. See Broome, supra note 9, at 102 & n.114; Countryman, supra note 9, at 770;
DeSimone, supra note 10, at 96, 108. This problem had been predicted early on by two
commentators, who noted that "the basic requirement that the payment of the debt be
made within forty-five days after the debt was incurred suffers from vagueness." Chaim
J. Fortgang & Lawrence P. King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Deci-
sions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1148, 1167 (1981). Experience proved them correct.
224. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 179.
225. See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983); Fortgang & King, supra
note 223, at 1168-69; see also Broome, supra note 9, at 100-02; DeSimone, supra note 10,
at 111.
226. Fortgang & King, supra note 223, at 1169-70; see also Broome, supra note 9, at
102-04; Countryman, supra note 9, at 770-72.
227. The legislative history leading up to the 1984 repeal of § 547(c)(2)(B) is de-
tailed in Broome, supra note 9, at 99-112. See also Countryman, supra note 9, at 770-72.
228. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, sec. 462(c), § 547(c)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
229. 130 CONG. REC. 20,091 (1984).
Mr. DeConcini: . . . . Am I correct that the elimination of the 45-day restric-
tion in subsection (c)(2) of section 547 will relieve buyers of commercial paper
with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that repayments of such
paper at maturity might be considered as preferential transfers?
Mr. Dole: That is correct, assuming that the "ordinary course of business or
financial affairs" and "ordinary business terms" requirements are met.
Mr. DeConcini: Would there be any doubt that companies that have a need for
short-term funds, and investors who wish to purchase short-term obligations,
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beyond merely protecting short-term commercial paper. 23 0 In one ill-
considered stroke of the legislative pen, Congress effectively undercut
the major premise of the preference reform effected in 1978-that of
making equality of distribution the paramount policy. The complete-
ness of the evisceration of the equality principle is evidenced by the
Union Bank v. Wolas 23' decision in December 1991, which held that
payments on a seven million dollar long-term loan could fall within the
protective ambit of section 547(c)(2) as amended in 1984.232
Another round of bankruptcy reform is in the offing, with S. 1985
being passed unanimously by the Senate on June 17, 1992.233 Title I of
that bill, which Senators Heflin and Grassley sponsored as a bipartisan
measure, proposes the creation of another National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission similar to that established in 1970. The bill does not
itself propose any changes to section 547(c)(2). However, it seems
likely that the Commission, if established, will look into the operation
of this controversial provision. In the next Part, I examine in detail
three normative justifications for the ordinary course exception.
IV, NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ORDINARY COURSE EXCEPTION
AND CRITIQUES THEREOF
A. Introduction
The nagging question remains whether this assumed need for pro-
tecting ordinary course transfers stands up to close scrutiny. What is
so sacrosanct about payments in the ordinary course of business by an
insolvent debtor on the brink of bankruptcy? Surprisingly, it is some-
what difficult to find a direct normative answer that is more than a
conclusory statement that "normal financial relations" should be left
undisturbed (as in the 1977 House Report).
2 34
Three explanations nonetheless may be offered. The first, insulat-
ing payment of current expenses, is drawn from the possible genesis of
cial affairs" if they were to deal directly or indirectly with each other in the
commercial paper market? And would not the payment of a commercial paper
note at maturity be in accordance with "ordinary business terms"?
Mr. Dole: Those understandings are correct. The commercial paper market is
an established market, and participants in it would presumably be acting in
the ordinary course of their business or financial affairs and on the basis of
ordinary business terms.
Id.
230. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 772; DeSimone, supra note 10, at 112.
231. 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
232. Id. at 533; see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
233. 138 CONG. REc. D 736 (1992).
234. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 373; see Nutovic, supra note 32, at 180.
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section 547(c)(2) in the judicial doctrine under the Act that protected
those payments. 23 5 I have categorized the second as value maximization
or the incentive effect. The final rationale that supports the ordinary
course exception is furthering repose.
Aspects of the deterrence rationale pervade all three of these argu-
ments. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Wolas236 stated
that "the ordinary course of business exception may benefit all credi-
tors by deterring the 'race to the courthouse' and enabling the strug-
gling debtor to continue operating its business."2 37 Nevertheless, I have
not focused on the deterrence argument as a primary justification for
the ordinary course exception in this part of the Article for several rea-
sons. First, the merits of deterrence as a rationale are discussed in Part
II above. Second, that discussion noted serious criticisms of the persua-
siveness of the deterrence justification. Finally, I believe that deter-
rence as a primary focus is somewhat inapposite to the question of who
gets to keep a preference, except in a negative inference sense.
B. Current Expenses
A number of commentators 38 and courts239 have asserted that sec-
tion 547(c)(2) is derived from the judicially developed current expense
rule, although the Supreme Court in Wolas was skeptical.4 0 As
pointed out earlier,241 the current expense doctrine was predicated
largely on the idea that payment of a current account does not dimin-
ish the debtor's estate and is not really for an antecedent debt when
one looks at the entire transaction-the credit extension and the pay-
ment-as a unit.2 2 It would then be unfair to the creditor and a wind-
fall to the other creditors to allow recovery of the payment while keep-
ing the value obtained in exchange. 243 In addition, the prospect of
preference recovery would cause trade creditors to demand cash up
front, which would drive the debtor out of business.244
The latter prong of the argument basically describes the negative
side of the incentive effect rationale, which is discussed in the next
section of the Article. That leaves the no-diminution, no-antecedent
235. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
236. 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
237. Id. at 533.
238. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981).
240. See Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 531.
241. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
242. See Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 531; Broome, supra note 9, at 113.
243. See Ward & Shulman, supra note 52, at 18 n.45.
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debt argument as a justification for the current expense rule.
Before assessing the merits of that argument, a more basic point
should be made. The current expense argument cannot justify the ordi-
nary course exception, as presently constituted and as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Wolas, because section 547(c)(2) is not even re-
motely limited to protecting payments of current expenses. Now pay-
ments on any debt, even those incurred years in the past, potentially
may be protected if that payment is held to be in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business. Although some overinclusiveness in legislative
drafting is often unavoidable, 24" section 547(c)(2) simply goes too far
beyond merely protecting payments of current expenses to be justified
on that ground alone. If that is in fact the only justification for the
exception, then Congress needs to amend section 547(c)(2) to better
accomplish the intended purpose.
There is no point in amending section 547(c)(2) to tailor it to the
purpose of protecting current expenses if that goal itself is not compel-
ling. Leaving the incentive argument to the next section, I suggest here
that protecting the payment of current expenses cannot logically be
justified on the no-diminution, no-antecedent debt ground.2 " To begin
with the obvious, the debtor's estate is diminished by the payment,
and the debt being paid was antecedent to the payment. Arguments to
the contrary prove too much.
Assume a creditor C who ships $1000 of the proverbial widgets to
the debtor D on credit, with payment expected within thirty days. Af-
ter receipt of those widgets, and before payment, the debtor's estate
includes the widgets, which are worth $1000. If the debtor were to file
bankruptcy at that moment, the estate would include those widgets.
2 47
In a Chapter 7 case all unsecured creditors would have a pro rata claim
against the value of those widgets-unless C has a valid reclamation
claim, which is discussed below.
2
The creditor, however, has only an unsecured general claim against
the debtor for the $1000 debt, which was incurred (at the latest) when
the debtor received the widgets. Even though payment may not be due
immediately, the creditor does now have a right to payment. If the
debtor were to file bankruptcy, the creditor would have a claim.2 49 The
debt therefore is defined to be antecedent to the payment, which in our
hypothetical has not yet occurred. If the debtor is insolvent, which is
245. See BAIRD, supra note 5, at 156; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 130; Nutovic, supra
note 32, at 185.
246. Professor Broome likewise rejected this argument. See Broome, supra note 9,
at 113-15.
247. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
248. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
249. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (Supp. I 1990).
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the only scenario in which a preference is vulnerable by definition, 50
the creditor would, however, receive less than full payment on the
$1000 debt.
If the creditor were paid in full prior to bankruptcy, the creditor
therefore is better off than under our hypothetical bankruptcy, in
which it would receive less than full payment. Assuming that the pay-
ment, came out of the debtor's estate, the estate is diminished to the
extent of that $1000. The dividend to all the other creditors in the
bankruptcy case will be reduced. This occurs because payments during
the preference period are made in 100¢ dollars to a creditor whose
claim against the insolvent debtor is measured in less than 1000
dollars.
But it arguably would be unfair for a creditor who does not know
that the debtor is insolvent to immediately lose money in one transac-
tion by trading 100¢ dollars in goods or other value to the debtor in
exchange for a claim worth less than 1000 on the dollar. However, a
creditor who extends credit knowing of the debtor's insolvency does
not deserve the solicitude of the law, for that creditor knowingly took a
chance. It is not a valid normative answer to say that section 547(c)(2)
offers the promise of keeping a payment received, for that does not
itself explain why section 547(c)(2) should contain such a rule. The
only possible argument to assist such a creditor is the incentive justifi-
cation, which is analyzed in the next section. It is worth noting here
that other provisions of commercial law do not assist the creditor with
knowledge.
25 1
The creditor who extends credit in ignorance of the debtor's insol-
vency may in fact be protected by a reclamation claim under section 2-
702 of the Uniform Commercial Code.252 If the creditor does have such
a reclamation claim, then payment might not be considered preferen-
tial because there might not be a preferential effect under section
547(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 ' To preserve that claim, the credi-
250. Id. § 547(b)(3) (1988).
251. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-702(2) & official cmt. 2 (1966), which provide only a recla-
mation right to a seller who discovers the buyer's insolvency after delivery.
252. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) provides in part:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days
after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day
limitation does not apply.
Id. § 2-702(2).
253. 11 U.S.C. 547(b)(5) (1988). To be enforceable in a bankruptcy case, a reclama-
tion claim may have to meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 546(c), which in certain
respects are more stringent than those of U.C.C. § 2-702(2). I hedged the statement in
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tor will have to be diligent in preserving its rights.2 51 '
The fundamental problem with the suggestion that the creditor
who is paid for current expenses somehow deserves to be paid is that it
ignores the whole idea of preference law. By definition all contractual
unsecured creditors of the debtor gave value to the debtor. At least
part of that value may still be in the debtor's estate, even if extended
long before the bankruptcy.2 55 However, because of the debtor's insol-
vency, all of these creditors cannot be repaid in full. The question is
why this current expense creditor should be treated better than those
other creditors. A value-added notion does not sufficiently justify the
distinction. If the rationale is to encourage last minute prop-ups of a
distressed debtor, we again are back to the incentive effect, which is
discussed in the next part.
If the transaction between the creditor C and the debtor D was
intended to be and was in fact "substantially contemporaneous" and
thus in essence one transaction, then section 547(c)(1) already provides
a safe harbor from preference avoidance.2 8 Section 547(c)(2) should
not be interpreted to effectuate the same purpose, but in a more per-
missive way. As a basic matter of statutory construction, it is most
plausible that Congress intended to implement the one transaction
purpose only in the subsection specifically crafted to achieve that end.
be sustained under § 546(c), in which case there would be a preferential effect. Second,
the bankruptcy court under § 546(c)(2)(A) can substitute an administrative priority
claim for the reclamation claim, thus creating the possibility that the creditor will not be
fully compensated if administrative priority claims are not paid in full. Finally, § 2-
702(2) only speaks in terms of actual reclamation of the goods themselves and does not
create an independent right of payment. However, the creditor who leaves the goods in
the debtor's possession and receives payment in lieu of reclamation could argue that the
relinquishment of the reclamation claim was a transfer of equivalent value.
254. A demand for reclamation must be made within 10 days after the buyer's re-
ceipt of the goods, unless the buyer made a written misrepresentation of solvency within
the preceding three months, U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1966).
255. See Broome, supra note 9, at 114; DeSimone, supra note 10, at 130.
256, Section 547(c)(1) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new
value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988); see Dunham & Price, supra note 9, at 490, 500-01.
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C. Value Maximization and the Incentive Effect
1. The Argument in Favor
The second justification for the ordinary course exception focuses
on the possibility of benefiting the body of creditors as a whole by in-
creasing the total value of the debtor's assets. The argument is some-
thing along the following lines. 257 If ordinary course transfers were
made subject to avoidance, then creditors would be even more reluc-
tant than they presently are to do business on a credit basis with a
financially distressed debtor. The withholding of credit from question-
able debtors would inevitably drive more debtors out of business and
into bankruptcy.258
If, on the other hand, ordinary course transfers are protected, then
creditors can safely continue to do business with financially troubled
debtors without having to worry that payments received now may have
to be disgorged later if the debtor subsequently files bankruptcy. In
essence, the ordinary course safe harbor can be characterized as creat-
ing or preserving an incentive for creditors to extend credit to dis-
tressed debtors.25 9 The positive results that supposedly flow from this
incentive effect may keep the debtor out of bankruptcy entirely, thus
making everybody better off.2s0 Even if the debtor does file a Chapter
11 case, it will be in a stronger financial condition when it does so be-
cause of the operation of the incentive effect. In either case the basic
notion is that even though some creditors are paid a larger percentage
share of their claim than others, every creditor ultimately recovers
more total dollars because the total asset pie is larger. The exact same
257. Countryman, supra note 9, at 775, characterized the argument as follows:
If a debtor selectively can meet debts currently coming due in order to con-
tinue functioning outside of bankruptcy, creditors should be encouraged to ac-
cept these payments, even though preferential. Consequently, creditors may
continue doing business with the debtor because they will not be penalized if
the debtor's attempt to function outside of bankruptcy fails.
Id. He goes on to say, however, that "[t]his justification is not compelling because it is
contrary to the entire concept of preference." Id. I agree. See infra part IV(C)(2).
258. See DeSimone, supra note 10, at 100, 106; Orelup, supra note 5, at 236. Profes-
sor Herbert recognized this as a valid goal, stating that "the trade creditor who, as its
buyer drifts towards bankruptcy, enters into an accommodation with the buyer under
which the buyer will reduce preexisting obligations in exchange for the creditor's permis-
sion to incur new ones, deserves significant protection from the dangers of preference
liability." Herbert, supra note 40, at 691-92. However, he questioned how effective
§ 547(c)(2) is in implementing that goal. Id. at 672. Furthermore, he noted that it is
possible that § 547(c)(2) "was not designed to encourage anything-but merely to avoid
penalizing unconscious preferences." Id. at 670 n.14.
259. See Broome, supra note 9, at 117.
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rationale is used to justify the controversial doctrine of necessity,
which authorizes the payment of selected unsecured claims in prefer-
ence over others during a Chapter 11 case.
2 61
A specific subset of the incentive justification relates to the market
for commercial paper. Legislative history suggests that one of the prin-
cipal reasons for the deletion of the forty-five day limitation from sec-
tion 547(c)(2) in 1984 was to bring issuers of commercial paper within
the protective ambit of that safe harbor.262 The concern expressed was
that the forty-five day limit, coupled with the repeal of the require-
ment that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent, exposed purchasers of commercial paper falling due
within the preference period to recapture. This result was unfair, the
argument went, because those issuers were entirely innocent of any opt
out motives. As matters stood, the market for commercial paper would
dry up. This, in turn, would deprive debtors of a much-needed source
of capital and would drive more debtors into bankruptcy.
2. Critique of the Incentive Effect Justification
Before turning to a critique of the incentive effect rationale as a
whole, I first want to refute the specific argument that relates to pro-
tecting the market for commercial paper, which at least in part moti-
vated the 1984 repeal of the forty-five day limitation.23 There are at
least three main problems with that argument. First, it ignores the fact
that in the event of a bankruptcy filing a temporal dividing line will be
drawn; the only question is where. Second, the argument accepts with-
out question the lending practices of banks. Third, it ignores equality.
If the maturity date of the commercial paper falls after the debtor
files for bankruptcy, then the holder of the paper is not entitled to
payment in full from the debtor. If the paper is backed by an irrevoca-
ble letter of credit by a solvent bank, then the holder can look to the
bank to be paid. If not, pro rata participation with all other unsecured
creditors would be mandated. Accordingly, to obtain favorable rates, a
commercial paper issuer usually must have the backing of an irrevoca-
ble letter.
However, the argument is that without section 547(c)(2) as it cur-
rently reads-or some similar safe harbor-the purchaser of the paper
would be worse off if repaid during the preference period than if not
repaid at all before bankruptcy. The reason is that payment discharges
261. See Charles J. Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75, 92-102 (1991).
262, See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
263, See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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the liability of the bank.264 Thus, in the event of a prebankruptcy pay-
ment during the preference period, the purchaser would have to return
the payment, but would not then be able to look to the bank. If pay-
ment does not come due until after bankruptcy, however, the bank is
still on the hook.
What is not clear is why this problem had to be fixed by insulating
the purchasers from preference recapture. Under this solution the
money with which the purchasers are paid during the preference pe-
riod while the debtor was insolvent effectively comes out of the pockets
of all of the other unsecured creditors, thus undermining the equality
principle. Instead, it would make more sense to have a rule that re-
quires the purchaser of the commercial paper to have to look to the
bank for payment, as is the case when the maturity date of the paper
falls after bankruptcy. Although the bank issuing the letter of credit
currently is discharged by payment, there is no obvious reason why
banking practices could not be changed so that the bank would under-
take to pay the purchaser in the event of preference recapture.
2 5
Let us now consider the broader issue of the validity of the incen-
tive effect justification. The first criticism that can be levied against
this justification for the ordinary course exception is that the prefer-
ence issue comes up only if the debtor in fact goes bankrupt. Thus, by
definition the ultimate objective of the incentive effect argument,
which is keeping the debtor out of bankruptcy, has not been realized.
Outside of bankruptcy a debtor is free to make preferences.
Second, the argument assumes that the legal rule chosen actually
will influence the decision of creditors whether to do business on a
credit basis with a distressed debtor. I find that assumption extremely
questionable. As discussed above, the argument that the preference law
deters last-minute grabs has been subjected to severe criticism.266
I likewise question the converse proposition-the supposed incen-
tive effect of the ordinary course safe harbor of preference law. I be-
lieve and my experience in practice indicates that the creditor's esti-
mation of the likelihood of the debtor's payment on a timely basis
dwarfs all other considerations. Whether a debtor will or will not go
into bankruptcy, whether a preference action will even be brought if
bankruptcy does ensue, and whether such a preference action will be
successful if brought are all much more remote concerns than the basic
question of whether the debtor will pay. In every credit extension the
creditor must consider that problem; the spectre of bankruptcy and
preference recapture is much less immediate.
264. See Broome, supra note 9, at 103 n.117; Countryman, supra note 9, at 771.
265. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 771.
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Thus, if the debtor truly is in difficult straits, a careful creditor
will insist on C.O.D. transactions no matter what the preference law
says. The fact that the preference law would permit the creditor to
keep any payment that the debtor made on account even if the debtor
soon goes bankrupt does not in any way enhance the debtor's liquidity
so that the debtor has the money to make that payment. Conversely, a
creditor who is willing to take a credit chance in order to make a sale is
likely to take that chance whatever the state of the preference law.
28 7
Third, even if there is an incentive effect, the model described
above is fatally deficient because it assumes that an ordinary course of
business exception creates only positive incentives to do business with
the debtor. The paradigm ignores negative incentives-namely that a
creditor might take into account the possibility that another creditor
might get paid in preference to itself and therefore decide not to lend.
If all creditors were rational economic actors, they would realize that
payments by an insolvent debtor to a group of creditors is a zero-sum
game. In other words, given that there is only a limited pool of assets
to distribute, payment to one creditor of more than its pro rata share
must of necessity come out of the share that otherwise would go to
another creditor. No creditor could be certain in advance that they
would be the lucky one who got paid. Economically, the percentage of
negative incentives should exactly balance out the positive incentives,
resulting in no net gain to the debtor in terms of credit made available.
This fact is illustrated in the example given below.
Fourth, the standard recitation of the incentive effect assumes
that section 547(c)(2) creates a greater incentive for creditors to do
business with the debtor and thereby keep the debtor out of bank-
ruptcy than would be true if section 547(c)(2) did not exist. On the
contrary, exactly the opposite may be true. Creditors may accept or
demand a payment within the preference period in the ordinary course
of business and then refuse to conduct further business with the
debtor, driving the debtor into bankruptcy. Given section 547(c)(2),
those creditors do not have to fear recapture of the payment in bank-
ruptcy. Indeed, section 547(c)(2) creates an incentive for trade credi-
tors to demand timely payment and to refuse to cooperate in a
workout.28 If section 547(c)(2) were repealed, however, and a stricter
recovery standard implemented, then creditors would have every in-
267. Although Professor Herbert adopted a theory of preference law with regard to
trade creditors diametrically opposed to that urged in this Article, he at least agreed
with me that the creditor may be willing (or not) to deal with a troubled debtor for
business reasons entirely unrelated to the state of the preference law. Herbert, supra
note 40, at 695 & n.113.
268. See Kraus, supra note 18, at 1458.
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centive to keep the debtor out of bankruptcy. Only by doing so would
the creditors be able to keep their payments.0 9
Fifth, even if the incentive effect really exists and even if it magi-
cally results in a positive increment in the amount of credit made
available to the debtor, the exception in section 547(c)(4) for subse-
quent new value already provides for an adequate incentive effect.2 7 0 A
creditor who extends new credit to the debtor during the preference
period after receiving an otherwise preferential transfer is protected
from preference liability to the extent of the new value given. The or-
dinary course of business exception in section 547(c)(2) therefore is im-
portant only for creditors who do not extend any further credit after
being paid off during the preference period. The need to protect these
creditors in order to keep the debtor's business going is far from
obvious.
A sixth criticism of the standard litany justification of the ordi-
nary course rule is that it ignores the adverse consequences stemming
from the application of that rule. Stated another way, that justification
necessarily must assume that the benefits obtained from insulating or-
dinary course transfers from preference avoidance outweighs any costs
resulting therefrom. Above I have questioned whether the supposed
benefits actually accrue as assumed. Even if they do, however, are they
worth the cost?
To answer this question of course necessitates identifying the costs
of having a safe harbor for ordinary course transfers. One cost is sim-
ple: one creditor gets paid, others do not. The premise of equal treat-
ment of similarly situated creditors is undermined.
Refer back to the example stated at the beginning of Part II. The
day before bankruptcy, insolvent debtor D pays creditor A the full
$600 owed, but pays nothing to creditors B and C. All three creditors
had extended credit in the ordinary course of business, and the pay-
ment to A was made on ordinary credit terms and in the ordinary
course of business. What is the result if a preference action is brought?
Without considering the provisions of any particular preference
269. Cf. McLaughlin, supra note 27, at 235 (stating that a creditor who is aware that
it can be compelled in bankruptcy to disgorge undue advantage is much more likely to
cooperate with other creditors); Kraus, supra note 18, at 1454-55 (discussing how prefer-
ence law is a means of encouraging cooperative rather than individual approaches to the
debtor's problems).
270. Cf. Dunham & Price, supra note 9, at 490, 501-02 (explaining how § 547(c)(4)
operates to give creditors a setoff against the trustee's preference claim for credit that
the creditor extends subsequent to the preference). The overlap between § 547(c)(2) and
(c)(4), and the possible use of (c)(4) to protect trade credit extensions to a distressed
debtor, are explored in Herbert, supra note 40, at 674-78. However, Professor Herbert
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law, fairness would seem to dictate that A should have to give back the
$600 that A received from D the day before the bankruptcy filing at a
time when D was hopelessly insolvent. The trustee then could dis-
tribute $200 each to creditors A, B, and C. Otherwise, the end result
would be that A would receive $600 and B and C nothing.
However, under section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, creditor
A almost certainly would not have to disgorge the $600 payment. All of
the elements of section 547(c)(2) appear to be satisfied in this example.
Thus, the probable result is that A gets $600 and B and C nothing.
Yet, this result ignores the fact that B and C were equally as wor-
thy as A on the very terms of the keep the debtor in business model,
for each extended credit to the debtor within the trade cycle immedi-
ately preceding bankruptcy. Furthermore, in terms of any incentive ef-
fect, the net incentive of the entire group of creditors A, B, and C, was
identical to that which would exist absent section 547(c)(2). Assuming
perfect knowledge, the creditors would calculate that the likely repay-
ment value package was $200. With section 547(c)(2) the calculation
would be V3 -the chance that each creditor has in advance of receiving
and keeping full payment, times $600 (the amount of the payment).
Without section 547(c)(2), the calculation would be a 100%
chance-even if someone were paid, they would have to give it
back-of receiving a 1/3 pro rata share, namely $200.
D. Repose
1. The Argument in Favor
The final normative justification for the ordinary course of busi-
ness exception approaches the whole issue from a completely different
orientation than the current expense and incentive effect justifications.
Those rationales attempt to explain as a positive matter why section
547(c)(2) effects a beneficent result. The repose justification operates,
however, from the premise that there is nothing to explain. Under this
argument those who advocate upsetting settled transactions should
bear the affirmative burden of justification.
The baseline assumption is that all prebankruptcy transfers
should be left undisturbed. The important policy of finality in com-
mercial transactions is preserved.2 71 Economically, this is the lowest
cost alternative. Recovering preferences entails administrative and liti-
271. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 269-70; Charles E. Neider, Note, Voidable Prefer-
ences: An Analysis of the Proposed Revisions of Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act,
1974 Wis. L. REv. 481, 491-92; Orelup, supra note 5, at 218.
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gation costs for the estate and for the creditor defendant. 72 Professor
Morris suggested that "[rlecovering all of the routine payments made
during insolvency and the preceding four month period merely to real-
locate these funds between the original recipients and the bankrupt's
other creditors would simply not be worth the cost."2 73 Similarly,
Professors Jordan and Warren observed recently, "If a doctrine
designed to obtain equality for all creditors interferes with normal
commercial practices and significantly adds to the cost of ordinary
commercial transactions, the cost of equality may be too high.
274
A second cost of preference vulnerability is the uncertainty cost
that is inflicted on the creditors.27 5 For some potentially extended time
period they cannot know whether they will or will not be able to keep
payments that they have received from the debtor. This possible expo-
sure to recapture limits the creditor's ability to use the potentially re-
coverable funds.2 76 This uncertainty also has a spillover effect on trans-
actions that involve debtors whose solvency is in doubt.
277
The repose theory then would assert that no suitable argument
can be made for avoiding ordinary course transactions. By definition,
the creditor recipients of an ordinary course transfer have done noth-
ing wrong.2 78 They have not attempted to opt out of the bankruptcy
proceeding.2 79 Accordingly, the deterrence rationale underlying the
preference law is inapposite.
Some advocates of the repose argument make the further assertion
that recognizing and protecting all preferential transfers before bank-
ruptcy is desirable. According to this view, the premise of similarly sit-
uated creditors, or of creditor equality, is a myth. Advocates of this
view argue that some creditors have more leverage in getting paid than
others-a point with which I would agree. They also argue that the
fruits of this leverage should, as a matter of economic efficiency, be
honored-a point with which I disagree.
2. Critique of the Repose Justification
Repose is a potentially legitimate basis for allowing ordinary
course transfers to stand. No one would seriously deny that the policy
of finality in commercial transactions is important. Parties need to and
272. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 266-67.
273. Morris, supra note 1, at 738.
274. ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 431 (2d ed. 1989).
275. See McCoid, supr'a note 2, at 267-69.
276. See id. at 267.
277. See id. at 267, 270.
278. See Morris, supra note 1, at 738.
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do rely on the finality of these transactions. Costs are implicated if
repose is ignored. In the next section I address the cost issue in connec-
tion with the ramifications of repealing the ordinary course exception.
Having said that finality is important, however, one runs the risk
of proving too much. If repose really is so critical, then how can we
rationalize permitting the recapture of any preferential transfers? The
most logical conclusion to be drawn from a sincere belief in the impor-
tance of finality is that section 547 should be repealed in its entirety.
Advocates of the more extreme version of the repose justification, that
even admitted opt out behavior by a creditor resulting in a preferential
transfer should not be avoided, possibly would agree with repeal. Pro-
fessor McCoid suggested that abolition might make sense, given the
failure of deterrence.28 ° He argued that at least then creditors would
have an incentive to monitor the behavior of the debtor and other
creditors and to precipitate collective proceedings earlier. 81
An alternative step, which recognizes the importance of repose but
stops short of complete abolition of preference law, is to establish an
absolute cutoff date prior to the commencement of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings beyond which transactions will be secure. This, of course, is
what the current preference law does by limiting the preference period
for noninsider creditors to ninety days before the bankruptcy filing.
2 2
Transactions completed prior to that period are totally protected in
the interest of finality, even if the debtor was insolvent at the time of
the transfer. It has been suggested that all transfers made after insol-
vency should be subjected to recapture without a limiting time pe-
riod.28 3 This approach completely ignores repose in the interests of in-
tercreditor equality.
The current embodiment of the policy of repose in the ninety day
exposure rule does not explain why repose also should be applied to
protect transactions that occur within the short preference period pre-
ceding the bankruptcy case. Section 547(c)(2) theoretically would pro-
tect an ordinary course transfer that took place an instant before the
bankruptcy case was filed. Once one admits, however, that any prefer-
ential transfers should be recaptured (here within the ninety days) and
that repose in and of itself therefore is not the ultimate trump card,
the difficulty of establishing a logical and workable premise upon
which to sort good from bad preferences arises. The issue is not really
about finality anymore.
Instead, the argument has again shifted back to equality versus
280. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 270-73.
281. See id. at 271-72.
282. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
283. See Kraus, supra note 18, at 1459.
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deterrence. Here the fundamental misconception is that the deterrence
rationale is the essence of preference law. The tension between equal-
ity and deterrence, and the defects in the deterrence justification, were
explicated above.284 The assumption that the current preference law
deters even blatant opt out behavior probably is erroneous.2 85 My con-
clusion was that the defining premise of preference law should be
equality of distribution between unsecured creditors after the debtor
becomes insolvent. The policy favoring repose does not change that
conclusion, unless one is willing to do away with preference law
altogether.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF REPEALING SECTION 547(c)(2)
Whenever one proposes a potentially radical change in the law, as
I do in this Article, prudence dictates a careful consideration of the
potential ramifications of the course of action propounded. The old
maxim that "the cure may be worse than the disease" states a truth
that must be confronted. Particularly when one proposes breaking with
over two hundred years of virtually unbroken precedent, caution is
indicated.
Bearing these caveats in mind, I nevertheless hold to my conclu-
sion that the cure of repealing the ordinary course of business excep-
tion is warranted for the disease of unrecovered preferential transfers
that create inequality between creditors. In a sense, Parts II and IV of
this Article dealt with the ramifications of repealing section 547(c)(2)
by considering in the former section the larger goals of preference law
and in the latter section the specific justifications for the ordinary
course safe harbor.
The most immediate ramification would be that what should be
the primary preference policy-equality of distribution between credi-
tors after the debtor becomes insolvent-would be furthered greatly. 286
Under the current scheme section 547(c)(2) undercuts equality to such
a degree that it cannot rationally be asserted that the preference law
substantially furthers that goal.
Consider the simple example that was stated at the beginning of
Part II, in which creditor A was paid in full the day before bankruptcy,
and creditors B and C were paid nothing, despite the fact that all three
had extended necessary credit in the ordinary course of business. My
proposal to repeal section 547(c)(2) would change the result of that
hypothetical. Whereas under section 547(c)(2) A would get to keep the
284. See supra part II.
285. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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payment, under the proposed change A would have to return the
money so that it could be distributed equally to A, B, and C. This, I
assert, is a better result.
To the extent one believes that deterrence works, that policy too
arguably would be furthered if section 547(c)(2) were repealed. If cred-
itors know that it is more likely that they will have to give back pay-
ments received if the debtor goes into bankruptcy within a short time
period (and that other unpaid creditors have the power to put them
there),2 8 7 then those creditors may be deterred from expending re-
sources to try to obtain those payments. Advocates of section 547(c)(2)
would say that grabbers are not protected thereunder because such a
grab would not be in the ordinary course of business. However, the
reality is that even grabbers have a better chance of keeping a prefer-
ential transfer if section 547(c)(2) remains on the books than if it is
repealed.2 8 8 Subtle or even not-so-subtle pressures can be levied
against debtors to prompt payments, which nevertheless later may be
classified as ordinary course. The extensive case law holding that even
late payments can be classified as ordinary course2 s8 suggests how wide
the window of opportunity for creditors is and how tempting it is for
creditors to ignore the possibility of subsequent recapture under the
preference law.
Perhaps more significantly, the transfer of some of the debtor's
assets to a few creditors after the debtor becomes insolvent is less
likely to trigger a wild scramble for the remainder of the debtor's as-
sets if the remaining creditors are secure in the knowledge that they
can instead file an involuntary bankruptcy case and then compel the
preferred creditors to give back what they took. Under the current sys-
tem, however, in which the preferred creditors have a good chance of
keeping what they receive because of section 547(c)(2), a mad race to
dismember the debtor is more likely to occur.
What are the potential negative consequences of repeal? It is fash-
ionable to project a parade of horribles that would result if section
547(c)(2) were repealed. Usually these center on the loss of incentives
that would result-namely a contraction in credit available to finan-
cially troubled debtors and a consequent compounding of business fail-
ures.290 The value of the debtor's assets would therefore not be maxi-
mized. The drawbacks of the incentive effect were detailed in Part
287. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988) (involuntary cases).
288. Cf. Kraus, supra note 18, at 1456 (stating that a grabber may be able to retain
a preferential transfer if it could keep the debtor out of bankruptcy for the statutory
period).
289. See, e.g., Yurika Foods Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. (In re Yurika Foods
Corp.), 888 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1989).
290. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
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IV(C)(2) above, and I reiterate them here.
The more substantial concern to be addressed if Congress repeals
section 547(c)(2) is the deleterious effect on finality and repose. In the
preceding section I attempted to point out that, while repose certainly
is a matter of valid concern, that policy is furthered primarily by the
establishment of the absolute (except for insiders) ninety day limita-
tion on the preference reachback. Within the ninety day period, it
makes less sense to focus on finality, in terms of justifying the ordinary
course exception itself, or in debating the effects of its repeal.
The chief practical ramification of repealing section 547(c)(2) that
must be considered is the cost, which is mentioned above as part of the
rationale supporting the repose policy. These costs can be subdivided
into litigation costs and uncertainty costs. Litigation costs will be in-
creased in one respect if section 547(c)(2) is repealed for the simple
reason that many more transfers will be subject to avoidance. If trust-
ees believe that a preference action has a better chance of success, they
are more likely to pursue it. It can be argued that this cost is a net loss
overall because all that is accomplished by the preference action is a
redistribution of assets from the one preferred creditor to the entire
body of creditors.
However, the argument that the ordinary course exception should
not be repealed because of increased litigation costs can be rebutted on
two levels. First, and most fundamentally, as is true with the repose
argument in general, it proves too much. The logical and ultimate con-
clusion reached if avoidance of litigation costs is identified as the para-
mount policy determinant is that section 547 should be repealed in its
entirety. All preference recaptures entail litigation and other transac-
tion costs, with only a redistributive effect. Because of this, some ex-
tremist law and economics advocates suggest repeal of section 547.
The unfairness inherent in validating all preferences, however,
leads me, as well as nearly everyone else who has considered the issue,
to reject this extreme view. The consistent condemnation of prefer-
ences for several hundred years in Anglo-American jurisprudence indi-
cates that total repeal is unlikely. Equality is given weight. If prefer-
ence law is retained in general, thus indicating that cost savings has
not been embraced as the controlling policy, arguing against repeal of
section 547(c)(2) on the ground that an incremental savings in litiga-
tion cost will be realized loses much of its persuasive force. Drawing a
line that allows some transfers to be retained, so that some costs will
be saved, but thus undermining equality, smacks of an arbitrary
compromise.
Furthermore, I am not even willing to concede that the repeal of
section 547(c)(2) will lead to a net increase in litigation costs. The
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important subsidiary goal of preference law reform,291 and the 1977
House Report likewise concluded that some major preference law re-
forms were justifiable partly on the basis of saved litigation costs." 2
For example, one of the primary reasons given for eliminating the rea-
sonable cause to believe standard in the 1978 legislation was to reduce
the cost of litigating preferences.
2 9 3
Anyone with even a passing familiarity with the realities of prefer-
ence litigation under section 547(c)(2) knows all too well that little if
any improvement over the old law has been obtained.2 4 The main is-
sue in almost every preference case involving trade creditors is the ap-
plication of section 547(c)(2). This is not surprising, given the fact that
the ordinary course exception is the conceptual successor to the rea-
sonable cause to believe test, and, more importantly, that the concept
of "ordinary course" is inherently quite vague. Any semicompetent
creditor's lawyer should be able to present at least a colorable ordinary
course defense. The prospect of daunting litigation costs in having to
counter an ordinary course argument undoubtedly deters trustees from
bringing many potentially meritorious preference actions and influ-
ences them to settle many more. If section 547(c)(2) were repealed,
however, a very large number of preference cases would be greatly sim-
plified; the creditor would not have even an arguable defense.
If potential litigation and administrative costs in permitting the
recapture of every payment made within the ninety days preceding
bankruptcy are viewed as simply unacceptable, much less radical alter-
natives than current section 547(c)(2) are available. One is to reduce
the preference period, which is discussed below. By reducing the period
of vulnerability, the number of exposed transactions likewise would be
reduced.
A second way to reduce unacceptable litigation and administrative
costs would be to extend the small preference exception of section
547(c)(7) to business debts as well. Such a comprehensive small prefer-
ence exception had been proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission for
all transfers to noninsiders for less than $1000.95 The Commission jus-
tified this proposal on the grounds that "[r]elatively small preferences
do not seriously impinge on the goals of [preference law]. In addition,
the expense of recovery is often disproportionate to the benefit to cred-
291. See COrMMISSION REPORT, supra note 197, pt. I, at 201, 204.
292. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 178.
293. See id.
294. See also DeSimone, supra note 10, at 96 ("The 1984 change expanded the
scope of 547(c)(2), but it will not, at least initially, reduce the amount of litigation.").
295. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 197, pt. II, § 4-607(b)(1), at 166; see also
Neider, supra note 271, at 493-94.
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itors."29 6 The National Bankruptcy Conference suggested a smaller
$500 exclusion, while the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
and the Justice Department rejected the proposal in favor of leaving
the whole matter of litigation efficiency to the discretion of the
trustee."'
Congress in 1978 chose to follow the latter course, but then added
the $600 consumer exception in 1984 in response to lobbying by the
consumer credit industry. Professor Countryman aptly pointed out
that section 547(c)(7) is hard to justify in conjunction with the ex-
panded protection available under section 547(c)(2).19 I would prefer
on the whole to repeal section 547(c)(7) and defer to the discretion of
the trustee in individual cases. If, however, cost concerns concomitant
with a repeal of section 547(c)(2) are simply too horrifying to contem-
plate, then I would suggest a comprehensive (i.e., for all types of debts)
small preference exception. The specific dollar amount chosen is not
something I am overly concerned with, but something in the range of
$500 to $1000 would be plausible.
The uncertainty costs involved in allowing preference recapture,
also discussed as part of the repose argument,2 99 must be dealt with as
well in considering the repeal of the ordinary course exception. Abol-
ishing section 547(c)(2) arguably will increase these uncertainty costs
because of the increased likelihood of preference recapture. The effect
may be that any payment received cannot be finally credited on the
books and then committed to other uses until ninety-one days after
receipt.
However, the potential incremental negative effect on these uncer-
tainty costs resulting from repealing section 547(c)(2) may be exagger-
ated. A creditor who has received a payment and is deciding whether
to invest that money, but who wants to take into account the possibil-
ity of preference recapture, first must discount substantially the
probability of that possibility by the likelihood that a bankruptcy case
will not be filed within ninety days. This, I submit, is by far the most
significant projection made and relied upon by the creditor (to the ex-
296. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 197, pt. I, at 206. The notes accompanying the
draft Act stated:
Its primary purpose is to eliminate litigation to recover property where the
actual return to creditors is nominal after deduction of the cost of recovery. A
secondary purpose is to soften the impact of other changes, including the elim-
ination of the requirement that a creditor had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor to be insolvent.
Id. pt. II, at 170 n.11.
297. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 813-14.
298. See id. at 814.
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tent the creditor considers the possibility of preference recovery in
bankruptcy at all). If the creditor does not think it likely that a bank-
ruptcy case will be filed within ninety days, then the creditor probably
will decide to go ahead and commit the funds received from the debtor,
no matter what the state of the preference law. If this is true, then
changing the law to increase the likelihood of preference recovery in
the event bankruptcy is filed within ninety days and a preference ac-
tion is brought should not have a significant incremental effect on the
creditor's decisionmaking process. Furthermore, the differential impact
on the creditor's uncertainty may not be substantial if section 547(c)(2)
is repealed, since even with that exception the creditor cannot be sure
to avoid preference recapture.
If the uncertainty cost nevertheless is determined to be unbear-
able, that cost could be reduced substantially by shortening the ninety
day preference period, say to forty-five days."'0 Then creditors could
know with absolute confidence that they would be permitted to keep
all payments received over forty-five days ago. The forty-five day pe-
riod is used elsewhere in commercial law as an indicator of a reasona-
ble exposure period.30 1 The uncertainty cost could be further reduced if
a comprehensive small preference exception were enacted. Adoption of
a forty-five day preference period also would reduce litigation costs by
decreasing the number of exposed transactions, as pointed out above.
At the same time, the increased certainty in and simplicity of prefer-
ence lawsuits actually brought (and thus reduced costs) stemming from
repeal of section 547(c)(2) would be preserved.
My proposal to repeal section 547(c)(2) does not in any way stand
or fall with the modest proposal to reduce the preference period to
forty-five days for noninsiders or possibly to expand the scope of the
small preference exception. As discussed in detail throughout the Arti-
cle, I believe that the supposed benefits of current section 547(c)(2) are
greatly overstated, as are the predicted harm from that subsection's
repeal. Even if it is concluded that the preference period should re-
300, The idea of coating the pill of eliminating a significant escape hatch for credi-
tors by reducing the preference period is not new. For example, Professor MacLachlan
suggested:
A possible compromise which has not yet received deliberate consideration in
this country might be to upset preferences within a period of ten or thirty days
prior to bankruptcy, without reference to the knowledge or belief of the trans-
feree. This would simplify the task of the trustee in cases of denuding the es-
tate at the eleventh hour without upsetting bona fide transactions over an in-
tolerable period.
JAMES A. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 269, at 311 (1956).
301. The interplay between the federal tax lien and a security interest arising out of
a commercial financing arrangement is a prominent example. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(c)-(d)
(1988); U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972).
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main at ninety days and that section 547(c)(7) should not be expanded,
I nevertheless remain adamant that section 547(c)(2) should be
repealed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have suggested that the true nature of preference
law should be seen as akin to strict liability. The discriminatory result
is the important fact. After the debtor becomes insolvent, one creditor
gets paid, and others do not. Fault-based criteria make little sense.
Supporters of section 547(c)(2) must bear the burden of explaining
why inequality, even in the absence of opt out behavior, should be
countenanced by the bankruptcy preference laws. I do not believe that
such a case can be made and therefore believe that section 547(c)(2)
should be repealed.
Any attempt to differentiate between preferences in this context
is, I believe, largely doomed to failure. Identifying the proper criteria
for sorting between good and bad preferences, and then fairly imple-
menting those criteria, has proven an elusive task at best for over two
centuries. Recent history alone under the reform efforts of the 1970s
and 1980s illustrates the daunting problem of the "me-too" syndrome.
Once some creditors are freed from the constraints of the preference
law, then all the others are clamoring for like relief, with notable
success.
Ultimately, one policy of preference law must predominate. Equal-
ity after insolvency as a model is fairest to all creditors, economically
most efficient, and logically most convincing. The current expense jus-
tification for the ordinary course rule proves both too much and too
little. The incentive effect is, I believe, devoid of persuasive force. Re-
pose does have some merit, at least for transactions that substantially
predate the commencement of the collective proceeding. A system that
recognizes repose through a limited cutoff requirement, but then gives
primacy to equality for transactions made after that date, is the one
endorsed by this Article.
In The Spirit of Laws Montesquieu wrote, "The freedom of com-
merce is not a power granted to the merchants to do what they please;
this would be more properly its slavery. The constraint of the
merchant is not the constraint of commerce."' 2 So too we should not
by section 547(c)(2) of our preference law give merchants virtual carte
blanche to aggrandize themselves at the expense of others. The guiding
principle of the preference law should be the spirit of equality.
302. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book XX, ch. XII, at 373
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